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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigated the development of early social-cognitive 
development in the first three years of life. While for a long time research on 
Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. the ability to attribute mental states as wishes, 
intentions, and beliefs to self and others, has focused on preschool age, in 
recent years also earlier social-cognitive development has gained attention. The 
assumption of continuity in social-cognitive development is one question we 
considered in the present work. Moreover, we investigated the influence of 
various factors on this development, specifically the impact of temperament. In 
addition, we further examined the impact of temperament on general study 
performance in infancy. In order to assess children’s temperament we used the 
questionnaires developed by Rothbart and colleagues as they provide a variety 
of parent-report questionnaires to adequately assess temperamental aspects 
across childhood from infancy to later ages.  
In study 1, we longitudinally investigated the social-cognitive 
development in infants and toddlers. We tested the relation between infants’ 
joint attention skills at 12 months and four further social-cognitive skills that 
emerge around the age of 18 months, namely children’s pretend play behavior, 
their ability to recognize themselves in a mirror, to imitate an intended action, 
and to reason about other people’s desires. Only single abilities were related to 
each other. Some joint attention skills, declarative pointing and detecting the 
experimenter’s goal in a teasing task, were related to toddlers’ understanding of 
intention-based imitation. Also, initiating joint attention and performance on a 
blocking task were both related to pretend solitary play. Additionally, pretend 
play and mirror self-recognition were related. The results of study 1 cast light 
on the relationship of different social-cognitive abilities in early childhood. 
They extend earlier findings and support the idea of continuity in social-
cognitive development. Specifically, they suggest that this continuity is not 
global but rather task- and age-specific.  
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In study 2, we longitudinally investigated the relation between infant 
temperament at 18 months and early ToM abilities at 3 years of age. In order to 
do so, we assessed temperament with the Early Childhood Behavior 
Questionnaire (ECBQ) and ToM by examining children’s understanding of 
divergent desires and beliefs, and of knowledge access. Recent research (Lane 
et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) indicated a developmental link between 
specific childhood temperament and Theory of Mind abilities. This idea based 
on the emotional reactivity hypothesis (Hare, 2007) that originally accounts for 
social-cognitive capacities in canines. The results obtained in study 2 are in 
line with such a social-emotional reactivity perspective postulating more 
sophisticated ToM abilities for children with less reactive more observant 
temperament. Children with shy temperament at 18 months and at 3 years were 
better in reasoning about others’ mental states at age 3. Findings indicate that 
temperament is related to ToM earlier in development than previously found, 
and that this relation is thus not unique to false belief understanding. 
In study 3, we longitudinally investigated the relation between infant 
temperament and dropout rate in two visual habituation tasks when infants 
were 6 and 12 months of age. At both age points, infant temperament was 
assessed with the Infant Behavior Questionnaire Revised (IBQ-R) and infants 
were presented with two habituation tasks that were similar in set-up and 
procedure but different in content. Consistent with previous work, dropout 
rates in the habituation tasks were very high and we investigated if this dropout 
was systematically influenced by infant’s temperament. Overall, only few 
temperamental traits, especially the ability to attend to something for an 
extended time, had an impact on dropout rate. This suggests that the relatively 
high dropout rates reported in infant looking time studies are not systematically 
related to infant temperament. However, findings also suggest that 
temperament might have an impact on the likelihood of dropout when a 
habituation task is conducted at the end of a longer test session. 
To summarize, the findings of the present work partially support the 
assumption of continuity in social-cognitive development. Yet, this assumption 
seems to do not apply generally on all ages and tasks used to investigate social-
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cognitive abilities emerging in the first three years of life. Besides, this 
dissertation provides further evidence for an early influence of temperament on 
children’s social-cognitive development. Nevertheless, temperament seems not 
to exert biasing influence on study performance, an important finding 
especially for infant studies using habituation tasks. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation war es, die Entwicklung der 
frühen sozialen Kognition in den ersten drei Lebensjahren zu untersuchen. 
Lange Zeit hat sich die Forschung zum Thema Theory of Mind, also die 
Fähigkeit sich selbst und anderen Personen mentale Zustände wie Wünsche, 
Intentionen und  Glauben zuzuschreiben, auf das Kindergartenalter fokussiert. 
In den letzten Jahren wurde das Augenmerk auch auf die frühe sozial-kognitive 
Entwicklung im Kleinkindalter gerichtet. Eine Frage, der wir in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit nachgekommen sind, ist die Annahme von Kontinuität in 
der sozial-kognitiven Entwicklung. Darüber hinaus haben wir den Einfluss 
verschiedener Faktoren auf diese Entwicklung untersucht, vor allem den 
Einfluss von Temperament. Zusätzlich haben wir den Einfluss von 
Temperament auf die generelle Studienleistung von Kindern im Kleinkindalter 
untersucht. Um das kindliche Temperament zu untersuchen, haben wir 
Elternfragebögen eingesetzt, die von Rothbart und ihren Kollegen entwickelt 
wurden. Diese Forschergruppe stellt eine Vielzahl an Elternfragebögen bereit 
um adäquat die unterschiedlichen Aspekte des kindlichen Temperaments vom 
Kleinkind- bis ins Schulalter zu untersuchen. 
In Studie 1 haben wir längsschnittlich die sozial-kognitive Entwicklung 
von Säuglingen und Kleinkindern untersucht. Dazu haben wir die Beziehung 
zwischen den Joint Attention Fähigkeiten im Alter von 12 Monaten und vier 
weiteren sozial-kognitiven Fähigkeiten, die sich etwa im Alter von 18 Monaten 
zeigen, untersucht. Dazu gehören das Als-ob-Spiel sowie die Fähigkeiten sich 
selbst im Spiegel zu erkennen, eine Handlung zu imitieren und Schlüsse zu 
ziehen über die Wünsche einer anderen Person. Beziehungen zwischen diesen 
Fähigkeiten konnten nur vereinzelt gefunden werden. Einige der Joint 
Attention Fähigkeiten, nämlich deklaratives Zeigen und das Entdecken der 
Absicht eines Versuchsleiters in einer das Kind neckenden Aufgabe, hingen 
zusammen mit der korrekten Imitation von Handlungen, in denen die Absicht 
nicht vollständig dargeboten wurde. Darüber hinaus hingen das Initiieren von 
Joint Attention und das Verständnis für das Ziel des Versuchsleiters in einer 
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das Kind behindernden Aufgabe beide zusammen mit dem Niveau des Als-ob-
Spiels, wenn das Kind alleine spielte. Eine weitere Relation wurde zwischen 
dem Als-ob-Spiel des Kindes und seiner Fähigkeit, sich selbst im Spiegel zu 
erkennen gefunden. Die Ergebnisse von Studie 1 beleuchten die Beziehung 
verschiedener sozial-kognitiver Fähigkeiten in der frühen Kindheit. Sie bauen 
bisherige Befunde aus und unterstützen die Idee von Kontinuität in der sozial-
kognitiven Entwicklung. Insbesondere lassen unsere Ergebnisse vermuten, dass 
diese Kontinuität nicht global, sondern eher aufgaben- und altersspezifisch ist. 
In Studie 2 haben wir längsschnittlich die Beziehung zwischen 
kindlichem Temperament im Alter von 18 Monaten und den frühen Theory of 
Mind Fähigkeiten im Alter von 3 Jahren untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck haben 
wir das Temperament der Kinder mit dem Early Childhood Behavior 
Questionnaire (ECBQ) erhoben. Die ToM Fähigkeiten der Kinder haben wir 
mit den Aufgaben Abgrenzung des eigenen Wunsches und der eigenen 
Überzeugung sowie Zugang zu Wissen überprüft. Jüngste Forschungen (Lane 
et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) deuten auf eine Beziehung zwischen 
spezifischen, kindlichen Temperamentseigenschaften und Theory of Mind 
Fähigkeiten hin. Diese Idee fußt auf der Emotionalitäts-Reaktivitäts-Hypothese 
(Hare, 2007) die ursprünglich aufgestellt wurde um die sozial-kognitiven 
Fähigkeiten von Hunden erklären zu können. Die Ergebnisse aus Studie 2 
entsprechen einer solchen Perspektive, die annimmt, dass Kinder mit einem 
weniger reaktiven, eher beobachtenden Temperament über fortgeschrittene 
Theory of Mind Fähigkeiten verfügen. Kinder, die mit 18 Monaten und 3 
Jahren als schüchtern eingeschätzt wurden, waren im Alter von 3 Jahren besser 
darin sich in andere Personen hineinzuversetzen. Diese Befunde deuten darauf 
hin, dass Temperament in Beziehung zu ToM steht, und zwar bereits früher in 
der Entwicklung als bisher angenommen. Die Beziehung zwischen 
Temperament und ToM ist daher nicht spezifisch für das Verständnis von false 
belief Aufgaben. 
In Studie 3 haben wir längsschnittlich die Beziehung zwischen 
kindlichem Temperament und der Abbruchrate in zwei visuellen 
Habituationsaufgaben im Alter von 6 und 12 Monaten untersucht. Das 
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Temperament der Kinder haben wir zu beiden Messzeitpunkten mit dem Infant 
Behavior Questionnaire Revised (IBQ-R) erhoben. Zusätzlich haben wir den 
Säuglingen zwei Habituationsaufgaben präsentiert, die sich in Aufbau und 
Ablauf ähnelten, aber inhaltlich verschieden waren. Die Abbruchrate in 
unseren Habituationsaufgaben war – übereinstimmend mit vorheriger 
Forschung – sehr hoch und wir haben untersucht, ob diese Abbruchrate 
systematisch durch das Temperament der Kinder beeinflusst wurde. Insgesamt 
hatten nur wenige Temperamentseigenschaften einen Einfluss auf die 
Abbruchrate. Die Fähigkeit, sich für eine längere Zeit einer bestimmten Sache 
zu widmen, könnte einen Einfluss nehmen. Dies lässt vermuten, dass die relativ 
hohe Abbruchrate, die in Blickzeitstudien mit Säuglingen üblicherweise 
berichtet wird, nicht systematisch mit dem Temperament der Säuglinge 
zusammenhängt. Allerdings lassen unsere Ergebnisse auch vermuten, dass 
gewisse Temperamentseigenschaften die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Abbruchs 
erhöhen, wenn z. B. die Habituationsaufgabe erst am Ende einer längeren 
Testreihe durchgeführt wird. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Ergebnisse der 
vorliegenden Arbeit die Annahme einer Kontinuität in der sozial-kognitiven 
Entwicklung zumindest teilweise unterstützen. Jedoch scheint diese Annahme 
nicht auf alle Alterszeitpunkte und Aufgaben zuzutreffen, die verwendet 
werden um die frühen, sich in den ersten 3 Lebensjahren entwickelnden, 
sozial-kognitiven Fähigkeiten zu untersuchen. Abgesehen davon liefert diese 
Dissertation Evidenz für einen frühen Einfluss von Temperament auf die 
sozial-kognitive Entwicklung von Kindern. Temperament scheint jedoch die 
Leistung bzw. das Durchhaltevermögen von Kindern in Studien nicht zu 
verzerren, was ein wichtiger Befund vor allem für Säuglingsstudien darstellt, 
da diese häufig Habituationsaufgaben anwenden. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Social Cognition 
From childhood on, fairy stories are familiar to us all. When reading 
them to children, parents might not be aware of the complex demands they 
make in terms of understanding the protagonists’ mental states such as 
intentions, beliefs and feelings (Hinchcliffe, 1996). Just the social cognitive 
content of a fairy tale leads to an understanding why the story characters 
behave in the described manner and only when appreciating the protagonists’ 
mental states their behavior makes sense (ibid). The well-known fairy tale of 
Little Red Riding Hood gives an example of how the ability to impute mental 
states is crucial for children either to fully grasp the meaning of the story or to 
only understand it as a succession of behavioral events (Lillard, 1997). In first 
instance, Little Red Riding Hood does not know that the wolf has eaten her 
grandmother and she thinks that her grandmother is lying in the bed. Even 
when children understand that Little Red Riding Hood is unaware of the 
presence of the wolf, at the age of 5 and 6 years some of them still ascribe her 
feelings of being afraid (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This shows that 
understanding all facets of mind is a very complex ability that does not develop 
in short time. Beginning with the example of understanding fairy tales I will 
now describe the role social-cognitive understanding plays in children’s daily 
life.  
Social cognition concerns our understanding of people and their doings. 
As Flavell (1985) summarizes it includes “thinking and knowledge about the 
self and others as individuals, about social relations between people, about 
social customs, groups, and institutions” (p.159). In general, social cognition 
concerns reasoning about social world as opposed to “physical and logical-
mathematical” world (p.119). During social-cognitive development children 
acquire the ability to recognize that they and other people perceive, think, and 
feel. Then, they begin to recognize that other’s perspectives may be different 
from their own and potentially inferable from the other’s perceptual 
experiences. Also, children recognize that thoughts might be recursive, that is, 
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one thought could have another thought as object. So, they were eventually 
able to build complex trains of thought and represent them. Much everyday 
interaction and communication seems to presuppose this kind of knowledge 
(Flavell, 1985). 
To effectively interact with other people already in childhood it is 
essential to understand the mental states of others. The ability to attribute 
mental states such as beliefs, intentions, and desires to oneself and other people 
and to understand that actions are causally related to these mental states is 
commonly defined as Theory of Mind (ToM). This term traces back to 
Premack and Woodruff (1978a). The authors postulate that attributing mental 
states works as a theory as such “states are not directly observable but need to 
be inferred like theoretical terms in science” (Perner, 1999) and as these, 
inferred mental states can be used to appropriately predict other’s behavior. To 
test if chimpanzees are able to infer such mental states to others, too, Premack 
and Woodruff (1978a) conducted the following study: They showed an adult 
chimpanzee a variety of videotapes displaying a human actor facing a problem, 
as for example being locked in a cage and trying to get out. For each problem, 
the chimpanzee had to choose the solution from different photographs (e.g., a 
key to open the cage) what the chimpanzee actually consistently did. Thus, the 
chimpanzee seemed to be able to infer the actor’s intentions to solve the given 
problems. At first, Premack and Woodruff (1978a) tentatively concluded that 
inferences about motivation might precede inferences about knowledge, both 
across species and developmental stages. In fact, rather than testing if 
chimpanzees are able to attribute mental states to others, the described task is 
suited for testing their problem solving abilities (Premack & Woodruff, 1978b). 
Fuelled by this classical work and the question if the ability to attribute mental 
states to others is specific for human cognition, ToM development has become 
a widely researched topic in developmental psychology (see Sodian & 
Thoermer, 2006, for a review). Between 3 and 5 years of age, children develop 
an explicit understanding of the causal relation between mental states and 
actions and therefore are able to correctly predict other’s actions. Around the 
age of 4 years, they understand that a belief about a state of affairs might be 
true or false and might therefore lead to a successful or faulty action (Wimmer 
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& Perner, 1983). The ability to comprehend another person’s false belief is 
usually tested with a false-belief task. One example for the so-called change-
of-location paradigm is the Maxi story: Children are told that Maxi puts his 
chocolate into a cupboard A. Then, that in his absence, the mother transfers the 
chocolate from A into cupboard B. In test, children are asked where Maxi will 
look for his chocolate when he returns. When children are able to represent 
Maxi’s false belief, i.e. “The chocolate is in A.”, apart from what they 
themselves know to be true, i.e. “The chocolate was transferred into B.”, they 
are able to correctly indicate where Maxi will look for the chocolate when he 
returns (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Hence, children need to understand that 
another person’s mental representation is different from their own, and to 
additionally take this knowledge into account when predicting or explaining 
her behavior. In their meta-analysis, Wellman and colleagues (Wellman, Cross, 
& Watson, 2001) showed that this developmental change is a robust 
phenomenon not specific to western culture. Additionally, they reported that 
reducing task difficulty did not increase the performance of younger children 
above chance. 
1.1 Early social-cognitive development 
Well before children pass this false-belief task, they seem to regard the 
subjectivity and directedness of mental states while interpreting human 
behavior. While for a long time ToM research has focused on the ability to 
comprehend another person’s false belief in preschool age, in recent years 
earlier social-cognitive development has gained attention, too (see Sodian & 
Thoermer, 2006). In this section, I will give a chronological overview about 
some of the social-cognitive abilities that are assumed to emerge during ToM 
development from infancy to early childhood.  
For example, there is evidence that infants as young as 6 months of age 
begin to understand human actions as goal-directed (Woodward, 1998, 1999). 
In her seminal looking time studies, Woodward habituated 6-month-olds to an 
event in which a hand grasped one of two objects that were located at different 
sides. During test phase, object locations were switched. In one test event, 
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reaching properties had changed while the goal maintained the same as in 
habituation phase, in the other test event it was vice versa. Infants showed a 
stronger novelty response to events in which the goal had changed (see also 
Hofer, Hohenberger, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2008). This finding indicates that 
they are able to represent the actor’s goal. Beyond, studies applying a modified 
Woodward paradigm by adding a salient action effect, as for example pushing 
the object backwards, (Jovanovic, Király, Elsner, Gergely, Prinz & 
Aschersleben, 2007; Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben & Gergely, 2003; 
for an overview see Aschersleben, 2006) showed that 6- to 10-month-olds are 
able to interpret even unfamiliar actions as goal-directed. The ability to 
understand human actions as goal-directed is potentially one of the first social-
cognitive abilities in children’s development. It is assumed to be related to 
preschoolers’ ability to attribute mental states to others. 
At the end of the first year of life, infants understand gaze and pointing 
gestures as goal-directed and they are able to share attention with another 
person in joint play (Tomasello, 1995). Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, 
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) argue that understanding of others as intentional 
agents, whose attention and behavior can either be followed or directed to third 
entities, is essential for infants’ early skills of joint attention. Carpenter and 
colleagues (Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello, Butterworth, & Moore, 1998) 
longitudinally observed infants’ early skills of social cognition and 
communication from 9 to 15 months of age at monthly intervals. They found 
that the considered skills followed a common order of emergence, namely 
share attention, follow attention/behavior, direct attention/behavior. From 
simply looking to an adult’s face to share her attention, infants have to take 
into account what an adult is attending to in a relatively distal space in order to 
follow or direct her attention (ibid.). In addition, they begin to use an adult’s 
social cues to decide how to behave in emotional situations, i.e. social 
referencing, and they begin to manipulate objects in the same manners as 
adults do through imitative learning.  
By 18 months of age, children differentiate between their own and 
another person’s opposite desire (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). After observing 
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an experimenter expressing disgust while tasting one food (e.g. crackers) and 
expressing happiness while tasting the other food (e.g. broccoli), children were 
asked to give her something to eat out of the two food bowls on a tray. 18-
month-olds were able to correctly infer the experimenter’s desire for the food 
she had prior associated with a happy facial expression. They gave her the 
preferred food (e.g. broccoli) even when this choice differed from their own 
desire. Children did not act egocentrically and besides, Repacholi and Gopnik 
(1997) could rule out that children simply gave the experimenter the food they 
themselves did not want. Hence, children at 18 months are not only able to 
infer a desire to another person from anterior experience. They also understand 
that desires are related to the person’s emotions and that desires might 
subjectively differ.  
Also at the age of 18 months, children infer the goal of an action, even 
if they only observe a failed attempt instead of the intended action (Bellagamba 
& Tomasello, 1999; Meltzoff, 1995). For example, children saw an 
experimenter trying to pull a dumbbell apart but her hands slipped off and she 
failed. When handed the toy after the experimenter’s demonstration, children 
rather produced the intended target action than imitated the observed failed 
attempt. Only by observing the experimenter trying but failing to perform a 
certain action on the object, children were able to understand her intention. In 
contrast, they did not tend to produce the intended action when the same failed 
attempt was demonstrated by a mechanical device. Hence, Meltzoff (1995) 
concludes that 18-month-olds’ attributions of intentions are restricted to social 
agents. 
At 18 months, children also engage in pretend play (Leslie, 1994; 
Piaget, 1962). According to Piaget (1962), pretend play – as well as deferred 
imitation and language – indicate the development of symbolic function that 
enables children to elaborate on mental content separately from reality (see 
Lillard et al., 2013). Thus, pretense seems to be “an early manifestation of the 
ability to understand mental states including one’s own as well as another’s” 
(Lewis & Ramsay, 2004, p. 1821). Lillard (1993) defines pretend play as “the 
projection of a supposed situation onto an actual one” (p. 349) with the purpose 
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of having fun. It can involve the imagination of an object where there is 
nothing at all or the substitution of an object as if it were another. Essential for 
pretense is that the pretending person and the potential playmates know that the 
pretended situation is different from reality and that a pretended identity is not 
bound by the features of an object (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993). At the age of 
18 months, children begin to appropriately respond to an experimenter’s 
request based on the actual “make-believe stipulation” (Harris & Kavanaugh, 
1993, p. 30). Children acted differently on a single prop depending on its 
temporary identity, for example, using a stick first as a spoon for stirring tea 
and then as a toothbrush. Hence, children at this age understand that a 
temporary pretend identity is appropriate only for a given context. 
In addition, 18-month-olds recognize themselves in a mirror reflection 
(Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). Pretending to wipe the children’s 
noses mothers applied some rouge on them. While placed in front of a mirror, 
the children’s behavior towards this mark was observed. Nose respectively spot 
touching serves as index for self-referential behavior (Lewis et al., 1989) and 
serves as a measure of a self-meta-representation (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). 
Gallup (1991) postulates that self-recognizers are capable of becoming the 
object of their own attention. Through this introspection, self-recognizers have 
access to their own mental states and therefore have intuitive access to the 
mental states of others. To take into account that the ability to recognize 
oneself in the mirror does not suddenly emerge at the age of 18 months but 
undergoes a gradual transition, Bischof-Köhler (1994) distinguishes between 
non-recognizing children, children in transition and recognizing children. The 
group of children in transition shows ambiguous behavior that falls into two 
categories: those children who don’t perceive the spot mainly show avoidance 
to prevent eye contact to the mirror image. Those who perceive the spot try to 
catch it in the mirror, search behind the mirror or treat the reflection as a 
partner. Children who already recognize themselves often experiment with the 
mirror e.g. monitoring while grimacing. This phase of transition indicates that 
the onset of mirror self-recognition underlies a broad variance. It can be 
assumed that this is true also for the other social-cognitive abilities but only 
few tasks allow the observation of progression. 
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Wellman and Liu (2004) assume that ToM also develops on a 
continuum. To adequately trace the social-cognitive development in early 
childhood, they constructed a ToM battery with increasing degree of difficulty 
assessing a range of different developmental attainments in children aged 3 to 6 
years. The scale consists of six tasks with two of them testing children’s false 
belief abilities. The tasks are described from least to most difficult: In the 
Divergent Desires task, the child needs to differentiate his or her own desire 
(e.g., preference for a cookie over a carrot) from another person’s differing 
desire about the same food items (e.g., preference for a carrot) to correctly 
predict the other person’s snack choice (e.g., the carrot and not the cookie). 
Whereas already 18-month-olds are able to infer subjective desires to others 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), in addition, 3-year-olds are able to predict and 
interpret other people’s behavior based on the understanding of their desires 
(Sodian & Thoermer, 2006). In the Diverse Beliefs task, the child needs to 
differentiate his or her own belief about the location of an object (e.g., the cat is 
hiding in the bush) from another person’s differing belief about the location of 
same object (e.g., the cat is hiding in the garage) to correctly predict the other 
person’s action (e.g., look for the cat in the garage). The Knowledge Access 
task requires an understanding of the causal relation between seeing and 
knowing independent of the own visual access to an object. In this task, the 
child is first shown the content of a box (toy dog) and then asked to judge 
whether another person who did not have visual access to the content of the 
box, knows its content. In the Content False-Belief task (or unexpected-content 
task), another classic false-belief task beside the above-mentioned change-of-
location task, the child needs to differentiate his or her own true belief from 
another person’s false belief about the content of a box. The child is first 
shown an unexpected content of a candy box (toy pig instead of chocolate 
beans) and then asked to judge another person’s belief who did not have visual 
access to the actual content. In the Explicit False-Belief task, the child is told 
the correct location of an object (e.g., the gloves are in the backpack) and that 
another person expects it in a different location (e.g., in the closet). To 
accurately predict that the other person will look for the object in the wrong 
location (closet) the child needs to understand that a false belief leads to faulty 
actions. Finally, in the Real Apparent Emotion task, a pretest controls for the 
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child’s ability to differentiate sad, happy and neutral facial expressions. In the 
task, the child needs to understand that a displayed emotion in the face (e.g., 
happiness) might differ from the emotion a person really feels (e.g., sadness) in 
order to hide the true emotion from a counterpart (see also Henning, Spinath, & 
Aschersleben, 2011 for task descriptions). Several studies showed that the 
children’s abilities increase with advancing age and that they can understand 
people’s desires, intentions, and ignorance well before they understand false-
beliefs (Kristen, Thoermer, Hofer, Aschersleben, & Sodian, 2006; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). By 3 years of age, children refer to desires and true belief in 
predicting another person’s action and begin to understand that visual access 
leads to knowing about the content of a box. Only at the age of 4 to 5 years, 
children are able to pass the false-belief tasks (e.g., Kristen et al., 2006).  
Similarly to ToM, also successful lying develops between 3 and 5 years 
of age (Sodian & Thoermer, 2006). Lying in children is often studied with the 
temptation resistance paradigm (Talwar & Lee, 2008). Children were told not 
to peek at a toy while left alone. In their classical study, Lewis and colleagues 
(Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989) examined 3-year-olds’ capacity for 
deception. Indeed, the majority of children used verbal deception: they peeked 
but did not admit their transgression when asked. Around the age of 4 years, 
children begin to consider the mental state of their counterpart when lying (see 
Talwar & Lee, 2008, for a model of lying development). The ability to lie 
seems to be strongly related to and maybe fostered by ToM development 
(Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Newton and colleagues (Newton, 
Reddy, & Bull, 2000), however, claim that young children’s lies are adaptive 
social strategies, for example to avoid negative consequences, that rather lead 
to an understanding in mental states of others than being based on ToM 
understanding.  
These studies show that a child’s understanding of subjectivity is 
already “progressively broadening and developing” (Wellman & Liu, 2004, p. 
536) in early childhood. In sum, already in their first 3 years of life and well 
before their ToM is fully developed, children know a lot about what is going 
on in another person’s mind. It is assumed that the early social-cognitive 
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abilities are related to children’s later ToM. In section 1.2, I will give an 
overview about the most prominent theories of social-cognitive development 
and then report empirical evidence that supports this assumption in section 1.3. 
1.2 Theoretical aspects of social-cognitive development 
There exist various theories to explain the mechanisms involved when 
reasoning about the mental states of others. In the developmental psychology 
literature, theory theory is supposed to best explain how ToM abilities are 
acquired (Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014).  
1.2.1 Theory Theory 
Theory theorists postulate that people have a naïve folk psychology 
trying to construct everyday theories to explain their observations and 
experiences. There are three theory characteristics that also apply to children’s 
understanding of mental states: (1) children’s theories involve characteristic 
explanations for unobservable entities,  (2) they include also incorrect 
predictions as well as predictions about behavior the children have never 
experienced themselves and (3) they lead to distinctive interpretations as the 
theories differ among children (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). According to 
theory theory, children’s intuitive theories undergo a conceptual change when 
they experience new evidence that is inconsistent with their current ToM. 
Children develop a more complex mental state concept by testing, modifying 
and reorganizing present knowledge about the causal structure of the world 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, 2012). In the following part I present two 
approaches of this account. 
1.2.1.1 Conceptual change of representations 
Perner (1991) assumes that the development of children’s ToM origins 
in the change and extension of their representational understanding. He defines 
three levels of representation that children pass in their first years of life: 
primary representation, secondary representation, and meta-representation. 
During the first year of life, children are tied to primary representations. They 
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are only able to conceive a currently real situation by a single updating model 
of the world. In the second year of life, secondary representations allow 
children to represent different situations (past vs. future, real vs. pretend) by 
constructing multiple, complex models. This enables children to break loose 
from present reality by representing past or hypothetical situations. Perner 
(1991) named children at this stage situation theorists as they now “understand 
representations as a special kind of represented situation” (p. 71). In the 
represented situation, children differentiate between the projection and reality 
without having a concept of representation. At around 4 years, children achieve 
the level of meta-representation, i.e. they are able to understand that 
representations represent representations. As representation theorists children 
are able to meta-represent a model about a model. They acquire a proper 
understanding of representation that helps them to form a ToM as they now 
understand the representational functions of mental states. This conceptual 
change enables them to understand that the mind can also misrepresent reality 
and only with that knowledge they are able to pass false-belief tasks. 
1.2.1.2 Three steps of a belief-desire psychology 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) assume that people act in a way they 
believe will lead to what they desire. Thus, by considering both desires and 
(potentially false) beliefs, we can understand other people’s behavior and their 
mind. From preschooler’s everyday conversations about the mind containing 
words as want and think/guess to talk about desires and beliefs, Bartsch and 
Wellman (1995) construed how children’s understanding of mind progresses. 
They describe three phases of development: early desire psychology, 
intermediate desire-belief psychology, and belief-desire psychology. In the 
second year of life, children possess a desire psychology. In this phase, they 
have no understanding of belief and they reason about own and other’s people 
actions and feelings only in terms of desires. These desires are seen as related 
to real objects, actions and state of affairs in the world and therefore, early 
desire understanding is considered to be nonrepresentational. Children in this 
phase are not able to consider more than this one set of real contents. They 
have no conception of representational mental states such as represented 
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objects of desire but can attribute desires to objects that are actually not there. 
They can predict an action but only on the basis of what they believe about the 
world. At 3 years of age, children have a desire-belief psychology. They 
recognize that beliefs exist and attribute them to others but when reasoning and 
explaining behavior they primarily refer to the actor’s desires without making 
recourse to beliefs. This expanded working model is only considered when 
desire psychology is insufficient to a consistent explanation. In belief-desire 
psychology, people’s beliefs are central for understanding their mind and 
actions. As mentioned earlier, children now understand that “people engage in 
actions that they believe will achieve their desires” (p. 149). According to 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995), preschoolers’ mental reasoning consists of the 
following constructs: Basic emotions and physiological states such as love and 
hunger that fuel one’s desire and perceptional experiences that lead to one’s 
belief and knowledge. Both, desires and beliefs lead to a corresponding action 
that leads again to predictable reactions depending on whether the action 
satisfies the desire or matches the belief. 
Whereas both, Perner (1991) and Bartsch and Wellman (1995), claim a 
conceptual change in children’s ToM development, “that is, developmental 
changes in performance on false-belief tasks reflect genuine changes in 
children’s conceptions of persons” (Wellman et al., 2001, p. 671), they provide 
different explanations how children achieve a ToM. Perner (1991) assumes a 
cognitive change in children’s representational abilities as basis for ToM. He 
argues that young children have a nonrepresentational understanding not only 
of the mind but also of typical physical representations as for example pictures 
or drawings. Children are only able to understand other’s mental states as they 
acquire an understanding of representations in general. As they achieve a 
concept of representation at the age of 4 years, they are able to understand the 
representational function of mental states that leads to a ToM. Differently, 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) view “the change to understanding 
representational states of mind […] as a development within children’s theory 
of mind” (p. 194). Hence, they assume that already at the age of 3 years, 
children represent mental states in terms of beliefs. They postulate desire-belief 
psychology as intermediate stadium between nonrepresentational desire 
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psychology and later belief-desire psychology that eventually enables children 
to understand other’s minds. As Perner (1991) views representation in a more 
complex way, he ascribes this ability only to children at the age of 4 years. In 
contrast, Bartsch and Wellman (1995) propose not to determine on this specific 
age but rather on developmental sequences (see Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 
194ff. for a comparison of the approaches). 
1.2.2 Simulation Theory 
Different from theory theory, the simulation theory denies that a theory-
like system drives our understanding of the mind. Harris (1992) assumes that 
children acquire the ability to attribute mental states to self and others “by 
means of a simulation process” (p. 120). Children predict and anticipate other’s 
behavior in a two-step process. First, they imagine having a particular desire or 
belief including the corresponding thoughts. Then, they transfer their own 
desires and beliefs to their counterpart by attributing the simulated desire or 
belief (Harris, 1991). Children’s ToM abilities increment by adjusting their 
working model that leads to a more accurate simulation of another’s person 
mental states. Hence, the difficulty of simulation depends on the degree to 
which the child’s own working model has to be adjusted (Harris, 1992). To 
eventually being able to represent another person’s false-belief, two default 
settings have to be adjusted: children have to ignore not only their own mental 
state but also the actual state of reality and instead have to feed relevant input 
to reach an accurate simulation.  
In regard to ToM development, both theories differ crucially. Whereas 
the simulation theory predicts that children have privileged access to their own 
mental states while still having difficulties in understanding the mental states 
of others, the theory theory presumes that the understanding of self and others’ 
mental states develop simultaneously when children reach the level of 
representation (Sodian & Thoermer, 2006). Empirical evidence supports the 
assumptions of theory theory, as children conceptualize own and others’ 
mental states at about the same time (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994). 
Particularly in false-belief tasks, children were not able to reason about others’ 
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mental states before accurately remembering their own false belief in this 
situation (Gopnik & Astington, 1988).  
1.2.3 Modularity Theory 
Modularity theory postulates that our understanding of the mind 
originates from an innate domain-specific cognitive module. Leslie and 
colleagues (Leslie, 1994; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004) claim a 
specialized ToM module that matures in children’s second year of life. In order 
to pass false-belief tasks, children additionally need an inhibitory controlled 
selection process that develops in preschool age. Therefore, only when children 
were able to inhibit their own true-belief about a situation, they can pass false-
belief tasks. 
Modularity theory was developed and is mainly applied in research on 
autism as the majority of children with autism typically fail to pass false-belief 
tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Many following studies supported 
the assumption “that autism involves a damaged theory-of-mind-module” 
(Leslie, 1992, p. 21). In this work, I will not further expand on modularity 
theory as for typically developing children, there is a lot of empirical evidence 
supporting theory theory (Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014). I pursue Wellman’s 
assumption of continuity in social-cognitive development (e.g., Wellman et al., 
2008) and present empirical evidence for a relation between putative precursor 
abilities and later ToM. 
1.3 Empirical evidence for continuity in social-cognitive 
development 
Many early social-cognitive abilities as described in section 1.1 have 
been supposed to be related to an explicit ToM. For example, Woodward 
(1998) holds that the early understanding of goal-directed action is a first step 
“toward developing an understanding of the relationship between intentional 
agents and the objects they act on” (p. 31) without reasoning of the actor’s 
intentions as mental states. Tomasello (1999) postulates that joint attention 
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skills were based on the understanding of self and others as intentional agents. 
This understanding also leads to an understanding of the voluntary attention 
and actions of agents when pursuing a goal. If the supposed relation exists in 
fact, then there have to be longitudinal relations from the single early abilities 
to later ToM as well as interrelations between these early social-cognitive 
abilities. By now, a variety of studies reported evidence that supports this 
relation to a ToM for early action-understanding (Aschersleben, Hofer, & 
Jovanovic, 2008; Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008; 
Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, & Lalonde, 2004; Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, 
Wynn, & van Marle, 2009), joint attention (Charman, Baron-Cohen, 
Swettenham, Baird, Cox, & Drew, 2000; Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015), 
intention-based imitation (Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops, & Perucchini, 2008; 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005), and pretend play (Youngblade & Dunn, 
1995). 
A very early precursor to an explicit ToM seems to be the attention to 
goal-directed action. Aschersleben and colleagues (Aschersleben et al., 2008) 
found that 6-month-old infants’ decrement of attention in a visual habituation 
task using a modified Woodward-paradigm (Woodward, 1999) was positively 
related to their false belief understanding at 4 years of age. This link between 
early action understanding and later ToM persists during infancy and was also 
found in infants aged 10 to 14 months (Wellman et al., 2004, 2008; Yamaguchi 
et al., 2009).  
Longitudinal evidence for a relation between joint attention abilities and 
later ToM development was found by Charman and colleagues (Charman et al., 
2000). They showed that 20-months-olds’ gaze switching behavior between an 
adult and an active mechanical toy as well as their looking to an adult in 
ambiguous goal detection tasks (teasing and blocking) were positively related 
to children’s ToM abilities at 44 months. In these goal detection tasks, children 
were expected to look at the experimenter for disambiguation when he teases 
the child by offering and then withholding a toy (teasing) or when he blocks 
the child’s view of a toy that she is manipulating (blocking). Recently, Sodian 
and Kristen-Antonow (2015) reported a positive correlation between infants’ 
INTRODUCTION     29 
 
 
declarative pointing to an object out of the experimenter’s sight at 12 months 
and their comprehension of false belief at 50 months.  
As to early intention understanding, a study by Colonnesi and 
colleagues (Colonnesi et al., 2008) revealed a relation between infants’ 
intention understanding at 12 and 15 months and their later understanding of 
another’s visual perspective as well as another’s intention at 39 months of age. 
In addition, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) reported a longitudinal relation 
between intention understanding at 14 and 18 months and internal state 
language at 32 months. 
Another potential precursor ability to a later ToM might be pretend 
play, however, findings are controversial. Whereas Youngblade and Dunn 
(1995) found a longitudinal relation between children’s role enactment in 
social pretend play with mother or sibling at 33 months and their false belief 
understanding at 40 months, subsequent studies did not find a relation between 
pretend play and ToM (Charman et al., 2000; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). It 
is noteworthy that these studies differed in the type of pretend play assessed. 
Perhaps only joint pretend play in a spontaneous play situation might be a 
precursor to ToM in contrast to solitary or prescribed pretend play, as only in 
joint pretend play children have to decode their partner’s nonliteral actions 
(Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993). 
Beside these findings reporting a relation of early social-cognitive 
abilities to later ToM and thus supporting the assumption of continuity in 
social-cognitive development (e.g., Wellman et al., 2008), there are only few 
studies investigating the interrelations between these early social-cognitive 
abilities. As all these early abilities are part of social cognition and all finally 
result in ToM, there should also be a relation between these social-cognitive 
abilities. By investigating how the single abilities were interrelated, the 
supposed continuity can be supported further on. So far, only very few 
interrelations were reported, which will be summarized in the following.  
Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2009) revealed a relation between infants’ 
understanding of intentional actions at 10 months and their performance in 
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intention-based imitation tasks at 14 months. Other studies showed that 
children’s declarative pointing relates to their understanding of other’s 
intentions in intention-based imitation tasks at 15 months (Camaioni, 
Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 2004; Colonnesi et al., 2008; Kristen, 
Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 2011). Also infants’ performance on the blocking 
and teasing tasks was found to relate to their understanding of other’s 
intentions (Charman et al., 2000). Recently, Sodian and Kristen-Antonow 
(2015) revealed a relation between children’s declarative pointing at 12 months 
and their mirror self-recognition at 18 and 24 months of age. Finally, mirror 
self-recognition and children’s pretend play correlate at the ages 15, 18 and 21 
months (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004), and both, the self-recognition and pretend 
play emerge at around the same age (Baudonnière et al., 2002; Nielsen & 
Dissanayake, 2004). In sum, there are some hints for interrelations between 
some of these early social-cognitive abilities, which are supposed to be 
precursors of later ToM. It seems that especially those abilities relate that 
involve the understanding of another person’s goal as well as those that require 
rather secondary representation, the ability to represent two different 
representations of the same object or situation (Perner, 1991). 
The first study in this dissertation will be examining some of these 
relations more thoroughly. For this purpose, we investigated longitudinally as 
well as cross-sectionally the following early social-cognitive abilities within 
one study. At 12 months of age, we tested joint attention abilities including 
declarative pointing and the goal detection tasks teasing and blocking. At 18 
months, we assessed children’s pretend play behavior and their ability to 
recognize themselves in a mirror, to imitate an intended action, and to reason 
about other people’s desires. 
In the next section, I will give an overview of the various factors that 
are considered to influence social-cognitive development as some of them are 
also investigated in the studies presented in chapter 2. Although ToM 
development universally follows the same developmental trajectory (Wellman 
et al., 2001) some factors might foster social-cognitive development.  
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1.4 Influence on social-cognitive development 
Various factors have been supposed to influence social-cognitive 
development such as attachment security (e.g., Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & 
Clark-Carter, 1998), mother’s interaction style (e.g., Symons & Clark, 2000), 
mother’s use of mental state language (e.g., Meins et al., 2002), cultural 
practices (e.g., Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008) and education (e.g., 
Lecce & Hughes, 2010), executive control (e.g., Perner & Lang, 1999), 
language development (e.g., Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), family 
background (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999), and recently also child temperament 
(Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, & Olson, 2011). Below I will give a short 
overview on the influence of language, siblings, and parental education on 
ToM. As it is a poorly investigated research question, yet, I will elaborate 
explicitly on temperament in the next chapter. 
1.4.1 Language development 
The relation between children’s language abilities and their ToM 
understanding is well investigated. A meta-analysis by Milligan and colleagues 
(Milligan et al., 2007), including 104 studies with English-speaking children 
below age 7, showed that both language ability in general as well as specific 
components of language ability (syntax, semantics, receptive vocabulary, 
memory for complements) were related to false belief understanding, with the 
lowest effect size for receptive vocabulary measures. Also for German 
speaking children, language skills are a significant predictor of ToM 
development (Lockl, Schwarz, & Schneider, 2004).  
On the one hand, language might have an indirect effect on ToM as 
poor language abilities may limit children’s task performance (DeVilliers & 
DeVilliers, 2000). Children have to possess sufficient language skills to 
comprehend the usually complex task demands. Otherwise, children’s limited 
language abilities might strongly constrain their ToM performance. On the 
other hand, language might have a true effect on ToM abilities. The 
acquirement of different language skills might be leading to enhanced false 
belief understanding.  
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There exist various hypotheses on the contribution of different language 
aspects being crucial for ToM development (Sodian & Thoermer, 2006; 
Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Perhaps, parents’ use of linguistic symbols to 
indicate mental states such as think, know, and belief is important to focus 
children’s attention to a mentalistic explanation of behavior (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995). The acquisition of these mental verbs seems to be important 
for the acquisition of the ability to infer mental states to self and others as these 
verbs refer to something that cannot be observed in others. Another possible 
explanation points out that the syntax in adults’ talk about mental states makes 
their children sensitive for the complement structure of utterances about mental 
states (DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 2000). Typically, utterances about desires and 
beliefs are embedded in complement sentences, as e.g. “Maxi thinks that his 
chocolate is in cupboard A”. The point is that the embedded part might be false 
while the main part is correct (DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 2000). That is, 
complementation allows representing counterfactual beliefs, for example what 
someone beliefs and what is actually the truth, and hence understanding of 
false beliefs. This assumption is supported by training studies (e.g., Lohmann 
& Tomasello, 2003) but there are also doubts as for example, German children 
understand desires earlier than belief although the linguistic complement 
structure is the same in both (Perner, Sprung, Zauner, & Haider, 2003). Also in 
English as well as Korean children sentential complementation was not per se 
related to false belief understanding (Farrar, Lee, Cho, Tamargo, & Seung, 
2013). In general, it could also be the kind of discourse per se in which 
children recognize that people differ in what they know and think (Harris, 
1996). Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) conclude that different aspects of 
linguistic interaction are crucial for a better ToM understanding. When 
discourses include disagreements, misunderstandings and clarifications, 
children have the opportunity to learn that their own perspective on a situation 
may differ from another’s understanding of the same situation. Even more 
important might be the opportunity to reflect their own perspective on a 
situation by parents evaluating the expressed thoughts of their children. In this 
way, normative perspectives are conveyed that lead to a differentiated 
understanding of individual beliefs and cultural norms and children have 
internalized “adult regulating speech” when they begin to pass false-belief 
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tasks. Another aspect seems to be the ability to understand and construct 
sentential complements, but as mentioned above there is little consent in 
literature. 
To follow up the numerous studies that provided evidence for a relation 
between language and children’s ToM abilities, we investigated the influence 
of children’s language skills on early social-cognitive development in the 
studies reported in chapter 2. 
1.4.2 Family background: Siblings and parental education 
Among family background characteristics, often siblings and parental 
education are considered (see Pears & Moses, 2003, for a review). Dunn and 
colleagues (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991) were the 
first to assume that various family characteristics may foster ToM 
development. Interactions with siblings seem to be relevant in that siblings 
share closer interests and feelings with the child as parents do and additionally, 
the child could profit by observing interactions between parents and sibling. As 
described above, family conversations and language abilities per se are another 
source for better ToM understanding. It is widely accepted that verbal ability 
depends on parental education (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dollaghan et al., 
1999). Also, as particularly maternal education seems to be related to their 
children’s intelligence, it might indirectly affect children’s ToM abilities (Pears 
& Moses, 2003). Therefore, also maternal and paternal education level are 
relevant as influencing factors. These explanations show how social 
interactions contribute to and shape ToM understanding (Dunn et al., 1991) but 
study results are inconsistent for both.  
Findings on the influence of siblings are controversial. A number of 
studies reported evidence for a positive influence of siblings on children’s ToM 
development (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; McAlister & Peterson, 2006, 2007, 
2013; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). In some studies, this positive 
influence on ToM development was found only for older siblings but not for 
younger ones (Farhadian, Gazanizad, & Shakerian, 2011; Lewis, Freeman, 
Kyriakidou, Maridaki Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, 
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Parkin, & Clements, 1998), or only for siblings that were between 12 months 
and 13 years of age that is, with whom the child may engage in sibling-based 
play (Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown, & Perkins, 2005; Peterson, 2000). Finally, 
several studies did not find any sibling effect at all (Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Henning et al., 2011; Peterson 
& Slaughter, 2003). 
Also controversial are the findings on the influence of parental 
education. Whereas some studies reported a strong relation between maternal 
education level and children’s ToM development (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; 
Henning et al., 2011; Pears & Moses, 2003), others did not find such an effect 
(e.g., Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999). The same controversy is true for an 
influence of paternal education level on ToM (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dunn & 
Brown, 1994). Perhaps, comparison between studies is difficult as, for 
example, studies used different tasks to assess children’s ToM abilities and 
also, they did not all control the influence of language (see Pears & Moses, 
2003). 
In study 2, one aim was to assess the influence of language, siblings, 
and parental education on early ToM development in children at the age of 3 
years. Moreover, the focus of study 2 was on the influence of temperament on 
ToM development. Temperament has only come into focus recently. Therefore, 
I will present this factor more detailed in an extra chapter and take into account 
not only its influence on social-cognitive development but also on children’s 
study performance.  
2 Temperament 
As it is known, children’s social experiences and interactions are 
influenced by their temperament (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Take, for example, 
stranger anxiety. Depending on the fear’s intensity children will either avoid or 
approach to interact with a stranger. Similarly, the experiences in interactions 
differ for introvert vs. extrovert children as well as for shy vs. communicative 
children. As described in the preceding section, social interactions contribute to 
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and shape ToM understanding (Dunn et al., 1991), also outside the family. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that ToM development is also 
influenced by children’s temperament (Wellman et al., 2011). In the next 
sections, I will first introduce temperament per se and then describe the few 
studies investigating the assumed relation between temperament and social-
cognitive development, so far. 
2.1 Definition, measurement and stability 
Temperament is commonly defined as personality traits that emerge 
early in ontogeny, show stability throughout childhood into adulthood, and 
have a substantial genetic component (Buss & Plomin, 1984; see Henderson & 
Wachs, 2007, for a review). While there is a general consensus in the literature 
about this definition, there are different assumptions about the components of 
temperament. I will give an overview about three prominent approaches.  
Thomas and Chess (1977) suppose a total of nine temperament 
categories based on empirical findings: rhythmicity of biological functions, 
activity level, approach to or withdrawal from new stimuli, adaptability, 
sensory threshold, predominant quality of mood, intensity of mood expression, 
distractibility, and attention span. Above, as these dimensions were developed 
for clinical purposes, they identified three temperamental patterns, namely 
easy, difficult and slow-to-warm-up temperament, to estimate the ontogenesis 
of behavior disorders. Buss and Plomin (1984) specify three independent 
temperamental dimensions of inherited personality traits: emotionality, activity 
and sociability. Emotionality refers to autonomous emotional arousal and is 
equivalent to the tendency to show distress. Activity refers to behavioral 
arousal and can well be measured by the rate and amplitude of body 
movements. Sociability refers to the preference for companionship instead of 
solitude and involves the number of social activities with others. A third 
approach offers theoretically derived temperament dimensions (Rothbart et al., 
2001). According to Mary Rothbart (1986), temperament is defined “as 
constitutionally based individual differences in reactivity and self-regulation” 
(p. 356; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Reactivity refers to differences in 
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infant’s emotional, motor and attentional reactions in terms of, for example, 
threshold and intensity, whereas self-regulation refers to behavioral processes 
such as attention or approach and withdrawal that regulate this arousability of 
responses.  
Whereas Thomas and Chess (1977) predominantly address behavioral 
style and Buss and Plomin (1984) are restricted to inherited traits, Rothbart 
(1986) is not that limited in focusing on reactivity and self-regulation. In our 
studies, we rely on Rothbart’s approach. She and her colleagues provide a 
battery of measures that enable one to assess temperament not only in different 
situations and contexts but also at different ages (see Goldsmith et al., 1987, for 
a review of the presented approaches). Also, their instruments are based on 
empirically findings and three broad temperament dimensions are found across 
ages. 
To measure individual differences in temperament from early infancy to 
childhood, Rothbart and colleagues developed a series of parent-report 
instruments, including the Infant Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ, Rothbart, 
1981) for infants between 3 and 12 months of age. The original version of the 
IBQ assesses six domains of infant temperament, namely Activity Level, 
Soothability, Fear, Distress to Limitations, Smiling and Laughter, and Duration 
of Orienting (for a validation of the German version of the IBQ see Pauli-Pott, 
Mertesacker, & Beckmann, 2003). A decade ago, Gartstein and Rothbart 
(2003) revised the questionnaire (IBQ-R) to assess temperament in a more 
differentiated way by including an additional eight subscales: Approach, Vocal 
Reactivity, High Pleasure, Perceptual Sensitivity, Sadness, Falling Reactivity, 
Low Pleasure, and Cuddliness (for a validation of the German version of the 
IBQ-R see Vonderlin, Ropeter, & Pauen, 2012). Analyses of the underlying 
structure through factor analysis suggest that infant temperament is structured 
in three broad dimensions: Surgency/Extraversion, Negative Affectivity and 
Orienting/Regulation (Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003). For the temperament 
questionnaire developed for toddlers (ECBQ, Putnam, Gartstein, & Rothbart, 
2006), the third dimension emerging was Effortful Control, which includes 
additional subscales to those related to the dimension Orienting/Regulation, to 
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account for developmental changes in self-regulation in the second year of life. 
These three dimensions are also to be found in the Children’s Behavior 
Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001) for children 
between 3 and 7 years of age. 
Research employing these instruments showed both developmental 
changes in infant temperament as well as relative stability of the underlying 
factorial structure. In a longitudinal study, Rothbart, Derryberry, and Hershey 
(2000) showed that already newborns differed in temperamental aspects such 
as distress proneness, activity level, and visual orienting. Further individual 
differences emerged for frustration and positive affect in the first months of 
life, for fear by 6 months of age, and for self-regulatory control in late infancy. 
Other changes in temperament subscales seem to be related to changes in 
infants’ emotional and self-regulatory development. For example, Activity 
Level as well as Visual Orienting lack stability in the first few months, 
potentially because activity level is initially related to negative affect and later 
in development to positive affect (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). A major 
development of the orienting system in the infant brain may explain early 
instability in visual orienting (Rothbart et al., 2000). In addition, in early 
infancy, attention seems to be more reactive than actively self-regulatory 
(Zentner & Bates, 2008), with self-directed attention focusing emerging only at 
the end of the first year of life. However, despite this developmental change, 
several studies provide evidence for stability of the three-factor temperament 
dimensions from infancy to toddlerhood (Casalin, Luyten, Vliegen & Meurs, 
2012; Komsi, Räikkönen, Heinonen et al., 2008; Komsi, Räikkönen, Pesonen 
et al., 2006; Putnam, Rothbart & Gartstein, 2008) and also single components 
of positive emotionality like Smiling and Laughter tend to be quite stable 
(Zentner & Bates, 2008).  
2.2 Influence of temperament on social-cognitive development 
Compared to the vast amount of research on influencing factors on 
ToM development, relatively few studies have assessed the impact of 
temperament on social-cognitive development (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001; 
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Carlson & Moses, 2001; Lane et al., 2013; Walker, 2005; Wellman et al., 
2011). Carlson and Moses (2001) found a positive relation between 
preschoolers’ inhibitory control and their ToM performance. Inhibitory control 
was rated by their parents in the same-titled subscale of the CBQ (Rothbart et 
al., 2001) and measured in a task that requested the children to respond counter 
to a prepotent tendency. ToM was assessed in a battery containing false-belief 
tasks as well as a deception task and appearance-reality task, where children 
had to distinguish the appearance of an object from reality. Banerjee and 
Henderson (2001) found a negative relation between school children’s self-
reported social anxiety and their performance in various social-cognition tasks, 
particularly when the social anxiety was paired with shy-negative affect. In a 
study with 5-year-olds, Walker (2005) assessed children’s temperament via 
teacher’s ratings of their peer-related social skills. She obtained positive 
relations between false belief understanding and aggressiveness as well as 
negative relations between false belief understanding and shyness, but only in 
boys. Whereas these earlier studies do suggest some influence of child 
temperament, they provide little consent with regard to what specific 
temperamental characteristics might enhance ToM development. 
Recent research suggests a developmental link between childhood 
temperament and ToM abilities that is specific to a less reactive more 
observant temperament (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011). Wellman and 
colleagues (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) refer in their work to the 
emotional reactivity hypothesis (Hare, 2007) to explain how child temperament 
might influence ToM development. This hypothesis originally accounts for 
social-cognitive capacities in dogs. It holds that dogs that were selected for 
domestication due to their nonaggressive and non-fearful temperament 
regarding humans, developed human-like social-communicative skills during 
domestication in convergent evolution with humans, i.e. level of emotional 
reactivity has modulated social-cognitive performance. In cooperative-
communicative situations, dogs show capacities similar to early social-
cognitive capacities of children, whereas wild canines and even chimpanzees 
perform poorly in such situations (Hare & Tomasello, 2005; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996). Further evidence supporting the emotional reactivity hypothesis derives 
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from findings showing that even bonobos and chimpanzees, the closest 
relatives to humans, differ in their social-cognitive abilities (Hare, Melis, 
Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007; Herrmann, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 
2010; Okamoto-Barth, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). Like dogs, bonobos 
outperform chimpanzees in social-cognitive tasks. These two species also 
differ from each other in temperament with bonobos being less aggressive and 
shyer than chimpanzees (Hare et al. 2007; Herrmann et al., 2010).  
Taking up this proposal by Hare and Tomasello (2005) that the initial 
difference in phylogeny might have regarded temperament, Wellman and 
colleagues (2011) assumed that also in child development an initial difference 
in temperament may lead to differences in interactive behavior and social 
experiences, which in turn may foster or interfere with the development of 
mental understanding. Supporting evidence is provided by their longitudinal 
study showing that 3-year-old children, who were rated by their parents as shy, 
nonaggressive and perceptually sensitive, showed more sophisticated ToM 
abilities in a battery of false-belief tasks 2 years later. Temperament was 
assessed via the CBQ (Rothbart et al. 2001) and additionally, the Child 
Behavior Checklist/Ages 2-3 (CBCL/2-3; Achenbach, 1992) was used to assess 
aggressive and withdrawn behavior. The authors argued that this “less reactive 
more observant temperament” (p. 321) facilitates social participation and social 
information processing. Similarly, Lane and colleagues (2013) found relations 
between less aggressive temperament and false belief understanding both in 
Chinese and US American preschoolers. Again, parents rated their children’s 
temperament with the CBCL/2-3 (Achenbach, 1992) and an abbreviated 
version of the CBQ (Rothbart, 1989). False belief understanding was tested 
with an unexpected-content task and a change-of-location task (see chapter 1 
and 1.1 for examples of the tasks). In addition, Lane and colleagues (2013) 
measured children’s hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical HPA-axis reactivity 
via salivary cortisol and reported that children with moderately high reactivity, 
which is related to social engagement and attentiveness (Blair, Peters, & 
Granger, 2004), exhibited more advanced ToM understanding. By including 
this physiological measure, they could clarify the relation between social 
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withdrawal and social-cognitive development, as only shy but not socially 
avoidant behavior fosters ToM development.  
2.3 Influence of temperament on study performance 
Beside the substantial influence of temperament on children’s social-
cognitive development, it can be expected that temperament is also relevant in 
a methodological way, as it may influence study results. It is important to note 
here that temperament-based dispositions and tendencies are not continually 
expressed but activated by specific situations. Test situations in a laboratory, 
especially habituation tasks in infancy, contain contextual factors that may 
activate these dispositions. Habituation in young infants has been widely used 
to examine the early perceptual and cognitive development (e.g., Colombo & 
Mitchell, 2009). The habituation-dishabituation technique is based on the 
circumstances that infants’ looking times decrease when they are repeatedly 
presented with the same stimulus (habituation), and that their looking times 
increase again when they are presented with a new stimulus they recognize as 
different from the previous one (dishabituation). When assessing infant 
cognition, infants are commonly habituated to one stimulus and then in the 
subsequent test phase presented with two new stimuli. These are both similar to 
the habituation stimulus but differ from each other in that one is consistent with 
the knowledge the infant is assumed to have, whereas the other stimulus is 
thought to violate the infant’s expectations and should thus result in an increase 
in looking time (see Slater, 1995, for an overview about habituation 
techniques). Not only has the infant to deal with an unfamiliar environment and 
interact with strangers, but also the habituation task as such demands the infant 
to remain calm and focused on the presented stimuli. It might thus very well be 
that those infants whose temperamental dispositions help them to easily adapt 
to these general requirements, show an overall better test performance than 
infants with a so-called difficult temperament (Thomas & Chess, 1977). 
 This assumption raises the question whether task performance differs 
not only as a function of differences in the cognitive abilities under 
investigation, but also as a function of differences in temperament (Vonderlin, 
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Pahnke, & Pauen, 2008). Despite its wide use in infancy research, concerns 
have arisen about factors that might affect the validity of the habituation 
technique, such as systematic dropout (e.g., Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007), 
that in turn might be influenced by the infant’s temperament. In fact, dropout 
rates in studies using visual habituation or violation-of-expectation paradigms 
are relatively high compared to infant studies employing other paradigms in 
which infants are required, e.g., to produce actions or to interact with the 
experimenter. In a review covering 101 published studies, Slaughter and 
Suddendorf (2007) reported dropout rates up to more than 60 % due to crying 
and fussiness. This raises the question whether dropout rates in habituation 
paradigms randomly vary or whether they are systematically related to specific 
infant characteristics. Slaughter and Suddendorf (2007) discuss infant 
temperament as one possible factor that might have an impact on the likelihood 
of dropout rates in visual habituation tasks. In this case, results obtained in 
habituation studies might not be generalizable to all infants at a similar age but 
instead reflect the abilities of a specific subgroup with distinct characteristics.  
So far, only few studies have assessed the impact of infant temperament 
on number of infants completing or not completing a visual habituation task, 
and they provided inconsistent results. As opposed to completers, those infants 
whose heightened level of distress during testing leads to termination of the 
experiment ahead of time, are in the following termed non-completers. 
Whereas older studies suggest an impact of temperamental factors on task 
performance (Miceli, Whitman, Borkowski, Braungart-Rieker, & Mitchell, 
1998; Treiber, 1984; Wachs & Smitherman, 1985), no differences in 
temperament ratings were found between completers and non-completers in 
newer studies (Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007; Vonderlin et al., 2008). Miceli 
and colleagues (1998), for example, assessed the performance of 4-month-olds 
in a paired comparison task and found that non-completers were rated as more 
active and more prone to smiling and laughter than completers. Treiber (1984) 
showed that infants, who did not complete a habituation task when they were 4 
months of age, were rated as more active, withdrawing and negative in mood at 
11 months of age. Also, Wachs and Smitherman (1985) tested 11-, 18- and 28-
week-olds in a habituation study and found that only female non-completers 
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received higher scores in fussy-difficult and unadaptable behavior. In a further 
study employing not a looking time task but an operant-conditioning task, 
female non-completers were rated as less attentive for extended time periods 
and as showing more distress to novelty than female completers (Fagen, Ohr, 
Singer & Fleckenstein, 1987). In contrast, in more recent work by Vonderlin 
and colleagues (Vonderlin et al., 2008), 7-month-olds’ differences in 
temperament were related to strength of familiarization response, but not to 
dropout rate. Similarly, Slaughter and Suddendorf (2007) did not find 
systematic relationships between experimental outcome and dropout in the 
sample of studies included in their review.  
Although especially the older studies point to some impact of infant 
temperament on dropout in looking time tasks, findings show little consent 
with regard to what specific temperamental characteristics might be crucial for 
completing these tasks. Furthermore, comparison between studies is difficult as 
studies substantially differ in the specific technique used, the ability or 
knowledge assessed in the experiment, infants’ age at testing and the 
temperament questionnaire used. The aim of study 3 was therefore to extend 
this line of research by also taking into account content of task as well as long-
term stability of individual differences in temperament and dropout. 
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3 Overview and goals of this dissertation 
The studies of this dissertation were part of a broader longitudinal 
project assessing a potential continuity in social-cognitive development in the 
first four years of life. In this project, 164 children were tested at five different 
age points: 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, 3 years, and 4 years of age.1 The 
main research question of the whole project was to analyze how mothers’ 
interaction style influences the social-cognitive development of their children, 
especially early social-cognitive abilities that were supposed to be precursor 
abilities to a later Theory of mind. A second aim was to assess if there is 
continuity in social-cognitive development as this assumption is still subject of 
controversial discussion in developmental psychology literature (Aschersleben 
et al., 2008; Henning et al., 2011). Additionally, it is still an open question to 
what extend this development can be fostered or impaired, for example through 
maternal interaction style quality or child temperament, language and cognitive 
abilities. 
The majority of the tasks that we conducted at the first four assessments 
(6 months to 3 years) within this project were part of the present dissertation 
with the exception of mother-child interaction and general cognitive abilities. 
Next, I will describe the goals of the three studies reported in this work:  
First, I examined the question if there is continuity in social-cognitive 
development. So far, only few studies have considered the interrelation 
between early social-cognitive abilities and only two of these studies (Charman 
et al., 2000; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004) have investigated the relation of 
more than two of these early social-cognitive abilities. In study 1, we aimed to 
extend the previous findings on continuity by examining longitudinally within 
one study to what extend five of these social-cognitive abilities in the same 
group of children are associated. At 12 months, we surveyed infants’ joint 
                                                
1 As some of the children did not take part in the project from the beginning but were included 
with 12 or 18 months and due to various dropout rates in the single tasks, number of children 
varies in the single studies. 
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attentional skills and at 18 months, we assessed children’s pretend play 
behavior and their ability to recognize themselves in a mirror, to imitate an 
intended action, and to reason about other people’s desires. Based on previous 
studies (Charman et al., 2000; Kristen et al., 2011; Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 
2015) we expected a relation between various joint attention abilities and 
children’s mirror self-recognition as well as their understanding of other’s 
intentions. Also based on previous work (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004), we 
predicted a relation between children’s mirror self-recognition and their 
pretend play. In addition, we expected to reveal further interrelations by 
investigating the above-mentioned abilities within one longitudinal study. 
Second, I investigated influences on social cognition, especially the 
influence of temperament on social-cognitive abilities. Recent research by 
Wellman and colleagues (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) suggests a 
developmental link between childhood temperament and ToM abilities that is 
specific to a less reactive more observant temperament. Their idea based on the 
emotional reactivity hypothesis (Hare, 2007) that originally accounts for social-
cognitive capacities in dogs. In their work (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 
2011) they have transferred research results on primates and canines on 
humans to explain how temperament might influence ToM development in 
preschoolers. The aim of study 2 was to extend this new line of research. First, 
we wanted to assess the influence of temperament on ToM development in 
addition to the well-investigated factors language abilities, parental education 
and siblings. Second, we wanted to test the influence of temperament on ToM 
development in children at the age of three years, that is, before the emergence 
of false belief reasoning. Based on the work by Wellman and colleagues (Lane 
et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) we focused on four temperament 
characteristics, namely Shyness, Fear, Perceptual Sensitivity and 
Anger/Frustration. We expected to find a positive relation between the first 
three temperament variables and children’s ToM at 3 years of age and, in 
contrast, a negative relation between Anger/Frustration and ToM. 
Third, I considered the influence of some temperamental characteristics 
on children’s study performance. There exists evidence that temperament 
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might be hindering in test situations, especially in visual habituation tasks 
(Miceli, et al., 1998; Treiber, 1984; Wachs & Smitherman, 1985). The question 
has risen if a high dropout rate is influenced by a special temperament of those 
infants not completing the tasks. As we follow the same children over a variety 
of tasks in this longitudinal project, it is important to test whether dropout was 
systematically related to infant temperament. Hence, the aim of study 3 was to 
longitudinally examine the impact of infant temperament on the dropout rate in 
visual habituation experiments in infants at 6 and 12 months of age, as 
habituation tasks are a particularly restrictive kind of study tasks. Besides, we 
checked for stability in temperament in the first year of life. Based on previous 
studies (Carranza Carnicero, Péréz-Lopéz, Del Carmen González Salinas, & 
Martínez-Fuentes, 2000; Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007), we expected a 
moderate number of dropouts in the current sample as well as a general 
stability of temperament across the two age points. Also, we predicted the 
temperamental domains Distress to Limitations and Duration of Orienting to 
have an impact on dropout as both tap relevant features of habituation 
experiments: The first one includes fussing and crying while frustrated or being 
motor constrained, the second one serves as an indicator for infant attention to 
a specific object or event. 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 presents the empirical 
research: study 1 reports on continuity in social-cognitive development, study 2 
deals with the influence of temperament on social-cognitive development and 
study 3 explored the influence of temperament on study performance. Finally, 
chapter 3 summarizes the three studies and integrates the respective main 
findings into the literature reviewed in chapter 1. To conclude, limitations and 
implications for future research are discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Studies 
Study 1 – Social-cognitive development from 
infancy to toddlerhood 
 
The aim of the current study was to extend findings on continuity in 
social-cognitive development by examining within one study to what extend 
prominent early social-cognitive abilities are associated. To our knowledge, 
this is the first longitudinal study that assesses cross-sectional and longitudinal 
relations between five of these social-cognitive abilities in the same group of 
children. 
To that aim, children’s social-cognitive abilities were assessed when 
they were 12 and 18 months of age. At 12 months, we surveyed infants’ joint 
attention skills (following another’s gaze and point gestures, ambiguous goal 
detection tasks, production of imperative and declarative pointing, and 
understanding of behavioral request). At 18 months, we assessed children’s 
pretend play behavior and their ability to recognize themselves in a mirror, to 
imitate an intended action, and to reason about other people’s desires. 
Additionally, we controlled for children’s receptive language abilities at 12 and 
18 months. Based on previous studies (Camaioni et al, 2004; Kristen et al., 
2011) we expected a relation between children’s declarative pointing and their 
understanding of other’s intentions as well as children’s mirror self-recognition 
(Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015). Furthermore, we expected a relation 
between children’s performance in goal-detection and their understanding of 
other’s intentions (Charman et al., 2000). Also based on previous work (Lewis 
& Ramsay, 2004), we predicted a relation between children’s mirror self-
recognition and their pretend play. Moreover, we expected to reveal further 
interrelations by investigating the above-mentioned abilities within one 
longitudinal study. 
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2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 139 children (61 females) from a medium-sized city in the 
southwest of Germany were included in the final sample and tested at 12 
months (M = 365.81 days, SD = 11.48, range = 324 - 397 days) and 18 months 
of age (M = 552.66 days, SD = 12.71, range = 530 - 607 days). Nine of these 
children only took part in the study at the age of 18 months. Parental 
educational level was relatively high: 59% of mothers and 63.3% of fathers 
held a college or university degree, 20.1% of mothers and 16.5% of fathers 
completed secondary school at top track (Abitur), and 20.9% of mothers and 
20.1% of fathers completed secondary school at lower or middle track. 
 Parents were recruited by telephone from a list of families who had 
earlier expressed interest in volunteering for research on child development. At 
each visit, they received a recompense for travel expenses and children were 
given a small gift and a certificate for participating. 
 
2.2 Tasks and materials 
Children were tested in a quiet laboratory room. Sessions lasted 
between 60 to 90 minutes. Beside the above-mentioned social-cognitive 
abilities, we assessed also general cognitive abilities and observed a mother-
child interaction. At 12 months, joint attention abilities were tested always at 
the end of the session, and always by the same female experimenter. At 18 
months, the social-cognitive tasks were administered by a total number of five 
trained experimenters in the following order: Pretend Play, Imitation, 
Divergent Desires and Mirror Self-recognition. 
2.2.1 Social-cognitive tasks at 12 months: Joint Attention 
The tasks assessing infants’ joint attentional skills were based on the 
Early Social Communication Scales (Mundy et al., 2003) and the ambiguous 
goal detection tasks by Charman and colleagues (Charman et al., 2000). In 
these interactive tasks, the child and the experimenter were sitting at a table 
facing each other. The children sat on their mother’s lap. Mothers were 
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instructed not to interfere in the session. The session was videotaped for later 
coding. 
 
Figure 1: Setup for joint attention tasks. 
1) Experimenter, 2) Child, 3) Target posters, 4) Cameras 
 
Point following (PF) and Gaze following (GF) to distal objects. Four 
DIN A3 posters were fixed to the walls, two behind the child (ca. 40°angle, left 
and right of midline) and two on the child’s side (90°angle, left and right, see 
Figure 1). Each infant received four trials, one per position, in one of two fixed 
orders: PF side (left), GF side (right), GF back (left), PF back (right) or GF side 
(left), PF side (right), PF back (left), GF back (right). After establishing eye-
contact by calling the infant’s name, the experimenter gasped excitedly, turned 
her head and torso and gazed (Gaze following) or gazed and pointed with an 
outstretched arm (Point following) at the target for 2 seconds, and looked back 
at the child (while keeping her arm outstretched in the PF trials) and shortly 
vocalized; she then gazed at the target and back to the child another two more 
times. The experimenter only vocalized when looking at the child. It was 
recorded for each trial whether the child scanned the right side without locating 
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the target (0), located the target (1), located the target and checked back with 
the experimenter (2), or did not follow the experimenter’s attention (no AF). 
Aggregated attention following scores were calculated as a function of gesture 
(AF Gaze Score, AF Point Score) and of target position (AF Side Score, AF 
Back Score) according to whether children reached less than Level 1 in both 
trials (0), reached at least Level 1 in one trial (1), or reached at least Level 1 in 
both trials (2). 
Object Spectacle (OS). To elicit joint attentional behavior, the 
experimenter activated one of three toys in front of the child and out of her 
reach: a jumping-jack puppet, a spinning top and a plastic Tigger that, when 
switched on, talked accompanied by a blinking nose. Toys were introduced in 
this order; following repetitions depended on the child’s interest. The 
experimenter presented the toy for about 6 seconds, briefly activating it 3 times 
consecutively, and then paused with the toy out of the infant’s reach while she 
continued gazing at the child. The occurrence of the following behaviors 
during the presentation and response period was coded: Initiating Joint 
Attention (gazing at the experimenter’s face), Showing the experimenter a toy, 
Declarative Pointing (pointing at an object out of the child’s reach with the 
index finger extended), and Imperative Pointing (pointing at an object out of 
the child’s reach with all fingers extended). Up to five OS phases were 
conducted during the joint attention session. 
Goal Detection Tasks. (1) Teasing. The experimenter offered the child a 
toy (mainly in response to an imperative point) and the moment the infant 
reached for it, the experimenter withdrew the toy for a period of 5 seconds. (2) 
Blocking. When the infant was manipulating a toy, the experimenter covered 
the infant’s hands with her own for a period of 5 seconds, thereby blocking the 
infant’s view of the toy. For both tasks it was recorded, whether the child 
looked up into the experimenter’s eyes within the 5-second interval. This 
behavior was interpreted as an imperative gesture with instrumental function 
(see Charman et al., 1998). 
Behavior Request (BR). Following an Object Spectacle phase, the 
experimenter handed the child the toy, let her manipulate it for about 10 
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seconds and then requested: “Give it to me!” The verbal request was 
accompanied by a palm-up hand gesture. Request bids were repeated up to 3 
times. It was coded whether the infant handed the toy to the experimenter 
within 3 seconds after the request or showed clear signs of comprehension, 
e.g., saying “no”, shaking her head, or pulling back the toy. The occurrence of 
understanding this behavioral request in at least one of the two trials was 
included in the analyses.  
The social-cognitive tasks were to be administered in a fixed order (OS 
1, AF 1, OS 2, BR 1, AF 2, OS 3, Teasing, AF 3, OS 4, BR 2, AF 4, OS 5, and 
Blocking) that, however, was flexibly adjusted to the individual child’s state. A 
Behavior Request as well as Teasing and Blocking always immediately 
followed an Object Spectacle Phase.  
Videos were coded offline for the occurrence of the joint attention 
behaviors. Ten of the 139 children were not tested in the joint attention tasks; 
further 2 children were excluded because of experimenter failure. For some 
children and tasks, data was missing due to fussiness (GF Back: 2, Teasing: 1, 
Blocking: 8, Behavior Request: 1) or experimenter failure (GF Back: 1, PF 
Back: 2, Teasing: 4, Blocking: 5, Behavior Request: 1). As OS 5 was missing 
for 42 children, only the occurrence of behaviors in the first four Object 
Spectacle Phases was included in the analyses. A second independent observer 
coded 30% of the videotapes of all children. Kappas for the occurrence of 
behaviors were: 1.0 (GF Side), .73 (PF Side), .77 (GF Back), .71 (PF Back), 
.78 (Initiating Joint Attention), .75 (Showing), .72 (Behavior Request), .72 
(Declarative Pointing), .39 (Imperative Pointing, match n=27, no match n=5), 
.91 (Teasing), 1.0 (Blocking), all p-levels < .006. 
2.2.2 Social tasks at 18 months 
2.2.2.1 Pretend Play 
Following Bornstein, Haynes, O'Reilly, and Painter (1996), the child’s 
pretend play behavior was observed in two consecutive 5-minute episodes in 
the following order: collaborative play with the mother and solitary play. A set 
of age appropriate toys were provided that included gender specific and gender 
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neutral categories and allowed for a variety of different play behaviors (e.g. 
puppets, teddy bears, cutlery, toy mobile phones, a photo camera, toy cars, or 
nesting barrels). Mothers were instructed to play with her child like they 
usually would at home. After 5 minutes had elapsed, mothers told the child to 
continue playing and then sat down at a table pretending to read a magazine. 
Mothers were instructed not to intervene in the child’s solitary play.  
 
Figure 2: Toys provided for pretend play. 
 
The child’s play behavior was coded offline from videotape. The interaction 
was divided into 10-second intervals and children’s play behavior was 
categorized according to Bornstein and colleagues’ (1996) eight level coding 
system. The highest level shown in each interval was coded. Levels 1-4 
corresponded to non-symbolic play: (1) Effect focused play (production of an 
effect, e.g., pressing the keys of a phone), (2) Inappropriate combination of 
two different toys (e.g., putting a toy car in a pot), (3) Appropriate combination 
of toys (e.g., nesting barrels), or (4) Transitional play with the child showing 
signs of, but no confirmatory evidence for pretend play (e.g. putting the mobile 
phone to the ear without vocalization). 
Levels 5-8 corresponded to evident pretend play: (5) Self- directed 
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pretence (e.g., drinking from a cup), (6) Other directed pretence (e.g., feeding 
a puppet with an empty spoon),  (7) Linking two or more pretence actions in a 
sequence (e.g., stirring with a spoon in a pot and then eating from the empty 
spoon), or (8) Substitution pretence, with using one or more object 
substitutions in a play sequence (e.g., using a cup as a phone and talking into 
it). Two additional codes were used for intervals 1) without any toy play or 2) 
with toy play that did not fall into one of the 8 categories (e.g., manipulating a 
toy without producing an effect). For each play condition, the data of one child 
was missing due to refusal to play. The interactions of 25% of the children (n = 
34, both play episodes per child) were coded by a second coder. Across all 8+2 
levels, Kappas were .84 and .81 for collaborative and solitary play, 
respectively, p-levels < .001. As in Charman and colleagues (2000), for 
analyses, occurrence of symbolic play (levels 5-8) was used as dichotomous 
variable. 
2.2.2.2 Imitation 
Two of Meltzoff’s (1995) six imitation tasks were administered: (a) 
pulling apart a dumbbell (dumbbell task), and (b) putting a loop on a prong 
(prong and loop task). The child on her mother’s lap and the experimenter 
were sitting at a table at a 90° angle. In the baseline, the experimenter placed 
the object(s) on the table in front of the child and encouraged exploration 
(“Look, what is this?”). Children’s spontaneous production of the target action 
was coded in the 20 seconds following the child first touching the object(s). In 
the demonstration phase, the experimenter tried but failed to perform the target 
action three times in a row without giving any nonverbal hints about her 
failure: (a) the experimenter’s hand (right, left, and right hand) slipped of one 
end of the dumbbell, and (b) the loop was released slightly off the prong (right, 
left, above). In the test phase, the experimenter placed the material in front of 
the child with the words “Now it’s your turn”. Children’s imitation of the 
intended action was coded in the 20 seconds following the child first touching 
the object(s). 
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Figure 3: Material for imitation task. 
 
Children’s manipulation of the objects was coded from videotape. The 
child’s action was scored 1 or 0 depending on whether she did or did not show 
the target action within the 20-second response interval in both baseline and 
test. Data of both tasks were excluded for 3 children because of fussiness (2) or 
experimenter failure (1). A second independent observer coded the 
performance of 27 % randomly selected children. For both tasks and both 
baseline and test, Kappa for the occurrence of the target action within the 
response interval was 1. 
2.2.2.3 Divergent Desires 
To test infants’ understanding of divergent desires we conducted the 
mismatch group condition of Repacholi and Gopnik’s classic study (1997). 
Two identical, opaque plastic bowls (diameter of 12 cm, height 6,5 cm) were 
placed on a wooden meal tray (44 x 32 cm), one filled with raw broccoli, the 
other filled with cookies. The bowls were placed in the left (broccoli) and right 
(cookies) corner on the infant’s side of the tray. The child on her mother’s lap 
and the experimenter sat at a table on opposite sides. In a 45-second baseline, 
the experimenter placed the tray in front of the child and asked her to taste the 
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food to reveal the child’s preference. The experimenter then moved the tray out 
of the child’s reach, picked up one bowl after the other and tasted the food in 
the following order: she first tested the child’s preferred food and facially and 
vocally expressed disgust “Eeew, (name of the food), eew, (name of the food), 
eew!” Then she tasted the other food, now expressing pleasure “Hmm, (name 
of the food), hmm (name of the food) hmm!” These two sequences lasted for 
approximately 10 seconds each, with the verbal comments fitting with 
intonation to the expressed emotion. In test phase, the experimenter placed her 
hand with the palm facing up on the tray between both bowls, moved the tray 
towards the child again and asked “Can you give me some, please?” right 
before the child could reach the bowls. To avoid biasing the child’s reaction, 
the experimenter did not look at any of the bowls but at the child’s face. If the 
child did not respond, the experimenter repeated the request up to two times.  
 
Figure 4: Divergent desire task. 
 
It was coded from videotape whether the child’s first action was to give 
the experimenter the food that the child (0) or the experimenter (1, 
understanding of divergent desires) preferred. Thirteen of the 139 children 
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were excluded because of experimenter failure (n = 9) and interfering behavior 
of parent (n = 4). Fifty-nine children showed other behavior such as only 
looking (n = 6) or gesturing (n = 12) at the correct bowl, irrelevant actions like 
eating (n = 36) or no action at all (n = 5), and were therefore not included in the 
analyses. A second independent observer coded the performance of 27% 
randomly selected children. Kappa for children’s behavior was .86, p < .001.  
2.2.2.4 Mirror Self-recognition 
A mirror (height: 97 cm, width: 40 cm) covered by a black sheet was 
placed in front of the child in such a position that the child could only see 
herself in the mirror. The experimenter encouraged the child to remove the 
black sheet from the mirror and then ensured that the child took a look at 
herself. After a short while, the mother inconspicuously placed some red 
lipstick with her finger on the child’s cheek while pretending to wipe the 
child’s nose. Then, the child was encouraged to look into the mirror a second 
time. After waiting for the child’s first response, the experimenter stated three 
questions based on Povinelli and Simon (1998): 1) she pointed at the child’s 
mirror image and asked “Who is that?”, 2) she pointed at the mirror image of 
the red dot and asked “What is that?”, and (3) she asked “I think there is a spot, 
can you show it to me?”  Each question was repeated once, if the child did not 
respond.  
Children’s behavior in front of the mirror was coded from videotape. 
Based on Bischof-Köhler (1994), the children were categorized as (0) spot 
negative when the child located the spot only in the mirror or only gazed at her 
mirror image, and (1) spot positive when the child touched the mark on his 
cheek or showed other behavior indicating self-recognition such as saying the 
personal pronoun or her name, exploring her mirror image or body parts only 
visible in the mirror. One child was not tested because of tiredness. Eleven of 
the remaining 138 children were excluded because of fussiness (n = 7) and 
experimenter failure (n = 4). Twenty children did not look sufficiently long 
into the mirror due to distress or disinterest and were thus excluded from 
analyses. A second independent observer coded the performance of 24% 
randomly selected children. Kappa for children’s behavior was .88, p < .001. 
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Figure 5: Mirror Self-recognition: Rouge Test. 
 
2.2.3 Receptive language ability 
Parents completed the “Elternfragebögen für die Früherkennung von 
Risikokindern“ (ELFRA-1, Grimm & Doil, 2006) at both age points, a parental 
questionnaire to identify children at risk for developmental language disorders. 
Although the questionnaire is generally used to detect a delay in language 
development judged at critical values, it can also be used to assess the actual 
state of the infants’ language skills. As a measure of language ability for each 
age, a Word Comprehension score was computed by summarizing the scores of 
the subscales receptive vocabulary and reactions to sounds (a maximum of 171 
can be reached). At 12 months of age, the ELFRA-1 Word Comprehension 
score ranged from 6 to 142 (M = 46.17, SD = 29.20, n = 127; 16% of children 
were at risk with a score < 17), at 18 months from 30 to 171 (M = 121.45, SD = 
31.47, n = 134). 
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3 Results 
3.1 Strategy of Data Analysis 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the relations 
between the examined social-cognitive abilities. First, point-biserial or Pearson 
product-moment correlations and phi coefficients were used to assess whether 
the single joint attention abilities were interrelated. Second, we conducted 
point-biserial correlations and phi coefficients to examine the relation between 
all assessed social-cognitive abilities. One-tailed tests were used when a 
direction could be expected based on previous findings. In the following 
section, we will first report descriptive results and then report correlational data 
focusing on the main question regarding a relation between the single putative 
ToM precursor abilities. In addition to significant results (p < .05), marginally 
significant results (.05 < p < .06) and trends (.06 < p < .10) are reported as 
well.  
3.2 Joint Attention 
In at least one of the four object spectacle phases, 95,3% of the 12-month-olds 
(121 out of 127) initiated joint attention by looking at the experimenter, 48% of 
the children (61 out of 127) did so by showing her a toy, 12% of the children 
(15 out of 127) showed declarative pointing, and 86 % of the children (109 out 
of 127) showed imperative pointing. In the goal-detection tasks, 72,9% and 
57% of the children (89 out of 122, 65 out of 114) looked at the experimenter’s 
face in Teasing and Blocking, respectively. 51,2% of the children (64 out of 
125) understood the behavioral request. In the attention following (AF) task, 
four different scores were analyzed. Table 1 shows the rate of gaze and point 
following behavior in each of the four AF trials as well as summarized 
performance scores as a function of gesture (Gaze and Point) or position of the 
target (Side and Back).  
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Table 1: Attention Following measures 
 
Number (and percentages) of infants at 12 months (n = 127) showing gaze and 
point following in each of the four AF trials and as a function of gesture (Gaze 
and Point) or position of the target (Side and Back). 
 no AF Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 
Gaze Side 24 47 30 26 
Gaze Back 15 76 29 4 
Point Side 2 34 30 61 
Point Back 4 82 33 6 
 less than Level 1 
in both trials 
at least Level 1 in 
one trial (1) 
at least Level 1 in 
both trials (2) 
AF Side 28 (22,0) 51 (40,2) 48 (37,8) 
AF Backa) 68 (55,7) 38 (31,1) 16 (13,1) 
AF Gazeb) 61 (49,2) 38 (30,6) 25 (20,2) 
AF Pointc) 32 (25,6) 57 (45,6) 36 (28,8) 
Notes: AF = Attention Following. Gaze back is missing for 3 children and Point back 
for 2 children because of their fussiness. a) n=122. b) n=124. c) n=125. 
 
3.3 Pretend Play 
Table 2 displays descriptive information regarding levels of pretend 
play. In collaborative play with the mother 14 % of children showed non-
symbolic play (levels 1-4) and 86 % of children showed symbolic play (levels 
5-8). In solitary play, 34 % of children showed non-symbolic play and 66 % of 
children showed symbolic play. The occurrence of pretend play in children’s 
solitary play and collaborative play was related, phi = .257, p = .003. 
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Table 2: Pretend Play Levels 
 
Frequencies (and percentages) of children (n=138) who reached the play 
levels 1-8 in collaborative and solitary play  
 Non-symbolic play 
Play scenario 1 2 3 4 1-4 
Collaborative play 3 (2) 0 (0) 7 (5) 10 (7) 20 (14) 
Solitary play 10 (7) 4 (3) 12 (9) 20 (15) 46 (34) 
 Symbolic play 
Play scenario 5 6 7 8 5-8 
Collaborative play 23 (17) 43 (31) 44 (32) 8 (6) 118 (86) 
Solitary play 27 (20) 35 (25) 24 (17) 6 (4) 92 (66) 
 
3.4 Imitation 
In the dumbbell task, 12 of the remaining 136 children were excluded 
because of aversion to take the object (n = 6), experimenter failure (n = 5) and 
interfering behavior of parent (n = 1). In the baseline, already 66 children 
showed the target behavior and pulled the dumbbell apart, in the test further 18 
children, in sum 84, did so, and 40 children failed to do so. In the prong and 
loop task, 13 children were excluded because of aversion to take the object (n = 
6), experimenter failure (n = 2) and interfering behavior of parent (n = 5). In 
the baseline, thirty children showed the target behavior and put the loop on the 
prong, in the test further 51 children, in sum 81, did so, and 42 children failed 
to do so. Due to the high amount of children that showed the target behavior 
already in the baseline of the dumbbell task, only the prong and loop condition 
will be further analyzed.  
3.5 Divergent Desires 
Forty-two (33,3 %) of 126 children took into account the 
experimenter’s divergent desire and gave the experimenter her preferred food. 
Forty-three (34,1 %) children failed the task and gave the experimenter his own 
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preferred food. Forty-one (32,5 %) children showed irrelevant behavior, 
primarily eating. 
3.6 Mirror Self-recognition  
Fifty (39,4 %) of 127 children located the spot in the mirror or only 
looked at their mirror image (spot negative behavior), 38 (29,9 %) children 
located the mark on their cheek, tried to touch or remove it (spot positive 
behavior), and 19 (15,0 %) children explored or played with their mirror 
image, said “me” or their own name (self positive behavior), the latter two 
behavior categories were rated as indexing mirror self-recognition. Further 
twenty (15,7 %) children were excluded from analysis because they were afraid 
of the mirror (n = 1) or showed disinterest as they rather wanted to play (n = 
19). 
3.7 Intercorrelations between putative precursor abilities 
Point-biserial correlations and phi coefficients were used to assess 
whether the single precursor abilities were interrelated. One-tailed tests were 
used when a direction could be expected based on previous findings. 
Children’s declarative pointing at 12 months is expected to be related to their 
understanding of other’s intentions (Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba & 
Colonnesi, 2004; Colonnesi et al., 2008; Kristen, Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 
2011) and to their mirror self-recognition at 18 months of age (Sodian & 
Kristen-Antonow, 2015). Also, infants’ performance on the blocking and 
teasing tasks at 12 months should be related to their understanding of other’s 
intentions at 18 months of age (Charman et al., 2000). In addition, mirror self-
recognition and children’s pretend play are expected to be related at 18 months 
of age (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004).  
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Table 3: Intercorrelations of the joint attention abilities at 12 months 
 
 Imperative 
Pointing 
AF Side AF Back AF Gaze AF Point Teasing Blocking Initiating JA Show Behavior 
Request 
Declarative 
Pointing 
-.131       
(n = 127) 
.149+      
(n = 127) 
.190*      
(n = 127) 
.110        
(n = 127) 
.220*      
(n = 127) 
-.109       
(n = 122) 
.055        
(n = 114) 
-.034          
(n = 127) 
.039        
(n = 127) 
.213*      
(n = 125) 
Imperative 
Pointing 
 .055        
(n = 127) 
.103        
(n = 127) 
.047        
(n = 127) 
.105        
(n = 127) 
.059        
(n = 122) 
.013        
(n = 114) 
.016           
(n = 127) 
-.016      
(n = 127) 
-.061      
(n = 125) 
AF Side   .437***  
(n = 127) 
.749***   
(n = 127) 
.657***  
(n = 127) 
-.003       
(n = 122) 
-.006      
(n = 114) 
-.003          
(n = 127) 
.029        
(n = 127) 
.006        
(n = 125) 
AF Back    .655***   
(n = 127) 
.717***  
(n = 127) 
.135        
(n = 122) 
.037        
(n = 114) 
-.084          
(n = 127) 
.076        
(n = 127) 
.015        
(n = 125) 
AF Gaze     .343***   
(n = 127) 
.170+      
(n = 122) 
.009        
(n = 114) 
-.086          
(n = 127) 
-.015      
(n = 127) 
-.032      
(n = 125) 
AF Point      -.055       
(n = 122) 
.021        
(n = 114) 
.007           
(n = 127) 
.119        
(n = 127) 
.054        
(n = 125) 
Teasing       .050        
(n = 109) 
-.138      (n 
= 122) 
.082        
(n = 122) 
-.055      
(n = 120) 
Blocking        .271** 
(n=114) 
.043 
(n=114) 
.133 
(n=113) 
Initiating JA         .092        
(n = 127) 
.080        
(n = 125) 
Show          .009        
(n = 125) 
Notes: +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. AF = Attention following. JA = Joint Attention. Number of children (n) in parentheses. 
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Table 3 shows the intercorrelations of the joint attention behaviors. All 
four AF scores were intercorrelated (rs between .343 and .749, ps < .001). In 
addition, declarative pointing correlated with behavioral request (phi = .213, p 
= .026) as well as with AF to the back or AF with Point (rpbs .190 and .220, ps 
< .032). Also, there was a relation between initiating joint attention and 
reaction to blocking behavior (rpb = .271, p = .005). The abilities in the goal-
detection tasks teasing and blocking were not interrelated (ps > .59). 
Tables 4 shows the cross-sectional correlations at 18 months of age. As 
supposed, mirror-self recognition was found to be correlated with the 
occurrence of pretence in both collaborative (phi = .215, pone-tailed = .013, n = 
107) and solitary play (phi = .186, pone-tailed = .028, n = 107). Unexpectedly, 
understanding of divergent desires was found to be negatively correlated to 
mirror-self recognition (phi = -.254, p = .038, n = 67) and the occurrence of 
pretence in solitary play (phi = -.185, p = .088, n = 85). 
Table 4: Intercorrelations at 18 months 
 
 
 
Divergent 
Desire 
Mirror Self-
recognition 
Pretend Play 
(collaborative) 
Pretend Play 
(solitary) 
Imitation -.063         (n = 79) 
-.099         
(n = 98) 
.006               
(n = 125) 
-.116           
(n = 124) 
Divergent 
Desire  
-.254*       
(n = 67) 
-.036              
(n = 85) 
-.185+         
(n = 85) 
Mirror Self-
recognition   
.215*             
(n = 107) 
.186*           
(n = 107) 
Pretend Play 
(collaborative)    
.257**         
(n = 138) 
Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 5 shows the longitudinal correlations between the abilities at both 
ages. As expected, joint attention abilities were longitudinally related to 
intention-based imitation as declarative pointing (phi = .126, pone-tailed = .090, n 
= 113) and performance on the teasing task (phi = .157, pone-tailed = .050, n = 
109) correlated with imitation.  
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Table 5: Longitudinal correlations between abilities at 12 and 18 months 
 
 DivergentDesire Imitation 
Mirror Self-
recognition 
Pretend 
Play 
(collabo-
rative) 
Pretend 
Play 
(solitary) 
Declarative 
Pointing 
-.088       
(n = 79)  
.126 (+) 
(n = 113)  
-.029         
(n = 96) 
-.052              
(n = 127) 
-.091           
(n = 126) 
Imperative 
Pointing 
.081        
(n = 79) 
.018     
(n = 113) 
-.075         
(n = 96) 
.019               
(n = 127) 
.129             
(n = 126) 
AF Side -.051       (n = 79) 
-.071    
(n = 113) 
.059          
(n = 96) 
.146               
(n = 127) 
.022          
(n = 126) 
AF Back -.066       (n = 79) 
.089     
(n = 113) 
.014          
(n = 96) 
.055     
(n = 127) 
-.114         
(n = 126) 
AF Gaze -.160       (n = 79) 
.079     
(n = 113) 
.021          
(n = 96) 
.094     
(n = 127) 
.002          
(n = 126) 
AF Point .053        (n = 79) 
-.073    
(n = 113) 
.021          
(n = 96) 
.103     
(n = 127) 
-.089         
(n = 126) 
Teasing -.259*     (n = 75) 
.157+   
(n = 109) 
-.118         
(n = 93) 
-.149(+) 
(n = 122) 
-.064         
(n = 121) 
Blocking -.244*     (n = 73) 
.050     
(n = 101) 
.076          
(n = 85) 
.135     
(n = 114) 
.157+        
(n = 113) 
Initiating 
JA 
-.228       
(n = 79) 
-.035    
(n = 114) 
.104          
(n = 97) 
-.004    
(n = 127) 
.259**      
(n = 126) 
Show -.113       (n = 79) 
-.026    
(n = 114) 
.075          
(n = 97) 
-.042    
(n = 127) 
.092          
(n = 126) 
Behavior 
Request 
-.012       
(n = 77) 
-.055    
(n = 111) 
.065          
(n = 94) 
-.012     
(n = 125) 
-.197*       
(n = 124) 
Notes: +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.     
 AF = Attention following. JA = Joint Attention. 
 
Also, joint attention abilities and pretend play were longitudinally 
interrelated as initiating joint attention (phi = .259, p = .007, n = 126) and 
performance on the blocking task (phi = .157, p = .096, n = 113) were related to 
the occurrence of pretence in solitary play. In addition, the understanding of 
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behavior request was negatively related to the occurrence of pretence in 
solitary play (phi = -.193, p = .030, n = 127).  
Also longitudinally, analyses revealed unexpected correlations for 
understanding of divergent desires: it correlated negatively to the performance 
on the blocking task (phi = -.244, p = .037, n = 75) and the teasing task (phi = -
.259, p = .025, n = 75). 
To control if the performance in any of these precursor abilities was 
associated with children’s receptive language abilities, we ran Spearman 
correlations and point-biserial correlations between these social tasks and the 
ELFRA word comprehension score at 12 and 18 months. Only at 12 months, 
significant correlations emerged between receptive language and the 
understanding of behavioral request (rpb = .302, p = .001) and performance on 
the teasing task (rpb = .184, p = .046). No other significant correlations 
emerged (p > .20).  
4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to longitudinally examine if and to 
what extend early social-cognitive abilities were interrelated. To this end, we 
tested infants’ joint attention abilities at the age of 12 months and pretend play, 
intention-based imitation, reasoning about other people’s desires and mirror 
self-recognition at the age of 18 months. The main findings showed a link 
between joint attention abilities at 12 months and intention-based imitation at 
18 months as well as a link between pretend play and mirror self-recognition at 
18 months.  
First, the link between children’s performance on the teasing task at 12 
months and their understanding of intention-based imitation at 18 months 
corresponds to the findings by Charman and colleagues (Charman et al., 2000). 
The ability to detect that another person pursues a specific goal in the teasing 
task (“What are you doing?”) and the understanding of another person’s 
intention seem to be closely related as both enable the child to conceive the 
other person’s inner intentions. In contrast, in our study there was no relation 
between performance on the blocking task and the understanding of intention-
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based imitation – and there was also no relation between the children’s 
performance in the blocking and teasing task. Only 57% of the children looked 
at the experimenter to uncover her goal in the blocking task (as compared to 
73% in the teasing task). Maybe, the positioning of the object affected 
children’s reactions in both tasks. Whereas the object was out of reach and near 
the experimenter’s face in the teasing task, children still held it in their hands in 
the blocking task. Potentially, this way the object per se still received more 
attention in the blocking task than in the teasing task so that fewer children 
paid attention to the experimenter in the former. In addition, it seems that the 
ability to detect that another person has a specific goal in these tasks had just 
emerged at 12 months of age. This would explain why there was only a small 
relation between children’s performance on the teasing task and their 
understanding of other’s intentions in our study, but a robust relation between 
both goal detection tasks and the understanding of intention-based imitation 
when children were 15 and 20 months of age, respectively (Charman et al., 
2000).  
In addition, our study revealed a trend for a relation between declarative 
pointing at 12 months and the understanding of intention-based imitation at 18 
months that is consistent with previous work (Camaioni et al., 2004; Kristen et 
al., 2011). The two authors assumed that both abilities “pave the way toward 
inferring information about objects or events, such as person’s unseen action 
goals” (Kristen et al., 2011). In our study, only the data of one imitation task 
could be included in the analysis, whereas in the above-cited studies at least 4 
tasks were assessed. This restriction in variance may explain why only a trend 
was revealed in the current work. Furthermore, the time interval between 
assessing declarative pointing and intention-based imitation was greater in our 
study, as the former studies both reported correlations to intention-based 
imitation with 15-months-olds and therefore the relation between both 
precursor abilities might have decreased until the age of 18 months.  
Furthermore, our results are in accord with previous research reporting 
a link between pretend play and mirror self-recognition at 18 months (Lewis & 
Ramsay, 2004). According to Perner (1991), both abilities rely on the capacity 
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for secondary representation, that is, children are able to represent things not 
only how they are but how they could be (see also Nielsen & Dissanayake, 
2004). In pretend play, children have a secondary representation beyond the 
real identity or feature of an object in order to pretend another thing; in mirror 
self-recognition, children have a secondary representation in order to match the 
mirror image with what they think they look like in reality.  
Additionally, we found relations between some joint attention abilities 
and pretend solitary play. Initiating joint attention by gazing to the 
experimenter in the object spectacle phases as well as children’s performance 
on the blocking task were both related to symbolic play, but only when 
children played alone. This result may seem counterintuitive, particularly 
because both joint attention abilities as well as collaborative symbolic play 
demand considering another’s perspective. However, 86% of the children 
showed symbolic play when playing together with their parent, thus this 
restriction in variance may explain why relations were only found for solitary 
symbolic play. 
Surprisingly, our results revealed some negative relations between the 
early social-cognitive abilities. Children’s reasoning about other’s divergent 
desire correlated negatively with performance on the blocking and teasing tasks 
at 12 months, occurrence of pretence in solitary play at 18 months as well as 
mirror-self recognition. Examining the results in the divergent desire task, one 
third of the children did not meet the experimenter’s request to give her 
something to eat, although children were familiar with give-and-take routines 
through the preceding session. Out of the remaining children, only 49,4 % gave 
the experimenter the preferred food, thus understood her divergent desire. The 
low performance of the children in our sample is similar to the results reported 
by Carlson and colleagues (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004) showing that 
even at 24 months of age children performed at chance in the divergent desire 
task. Similarly, Poulin-Dubois and colleagues found that at the ages of 18, 24 
and 30 months only half of the children passed this task (personal 
communication, June 2014). This might be the reason why the reported 
negative correlations occurred rather accidental and we desist to interpret them 
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content-related. Beyond, based on the assumption of a continuity in social-
cognitive development, there is only a theoretical assumption that reasoning 
about other people’s desires also belongs to the putative precursor abilities. To 
our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for a relation between 
understanding of divergent desires and Theory of Mind. For example, Carlson 
and colleagues (Carlson et al., 2004) did not find a relation between children’s 
performance in the Divergent Desire task conducted at two different age points 
(24 and 39 months) and their ToM at 39 months. 
Our results revealed relatively few inter-relations between the single 
early social-cognitive abilities. One limitation of the present study was the fact 
that most of the variables were dichotomous rather than interval-scaled 
variables. Originally, tasks were designed for aggregating the data to a sum 
score but due to children’s performance in baseline (dumbbell in intention-
based imitation) or missing correlations (goal detection tasks) only one 
condition could be analyzed or data had to be analyzed separately.  
Based on previous work, we had expected to reveal more inter-relations 
especially with attention following and understanding of divergent desires. 
Thus, the current results replicate previous findings only in part. Understanding 
of another person’s intention was related to the joint attention abilities 
declarative pointing as well as to detecting another person’s goal in the teasing 
task. Additionally, pretend play and mirror self-recognition were related.  
In summary, the current work complements earlier findings and adds 
further evidence in support of continuity in social-cognitive development. 
Specifically, findings suggest that the assumed continuity in social-cognitive 
development is not global but task- and age-specific. First, inter-relations 
between the precursor abilities were rather task-specific than fundamental 
across the concepts. Second, it seems to have a great effect at what age point 
the different putative precursor abilities were assessed. Possibly, these abilities 
are part of an underlying “social cognitive representational ability” (Charman 
et al., 2000, p. 492) that emerges within a specific timeframe (e.g. second year 
of life), after which abilities develop along diverging pathways. In our case, 
alternatively, it might be that some associations were not found as children 
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were just at the beginning to develop the single abilities as we investigated 
relatively young children. To test this hypothesis, future studies should 
systematically assess the respective abilities not only with a single task at one 
age point but with a variety of complement tasks at different ages in continuous 
shorter intervals. Maybe in so doing, more (age- and task-) specific cross-
sectional and longitudinal associations between the putative precursor abilities 
could be detected that could otherwise not be discovered by only assessing 
single abilities at single age points. 
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Study 2 – Temperament and early Theory of mind 
abilities 
As outlined in the introduction, the relationship between temperament 
and ToM development has only been investigated in preschoolers or older 
children. Thus, the general aim of the present study was to extend this line of 
research by longitudinally investigating the impact of early temperamental 
characteristics on ToM development. Specifically, we wanted to assess 
whether individual differences in infant temperament is related to early ToM 
competence, that is, before the emergence of false belief reasoning. Based on 
previous work on factors influencing ToM development, we controlled for 
children’s language abilities, parental education and presence as well as 
number of siblings.  
To that aim, we tested children at 18 months and again at 3 years of 
age: At visit 1, we surveyed infants’ temperament and language abilities via 
parental questionnaires, at visit 2, we surveyed children’s temperament via 
parental questionnaire and tested their language as well as their early ToM 
abilities. Based on previous work (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) and 
with regard to the emotional reactivity hypothesis, we focused in our analyses 
on the temperament characteristics Shyness, Fear, Perceptual Sensitivity and 
Anger/Frustration. We expected a positive relation between the first three 
temperament variables and ToM performance at 3 years of age and a negative 
relation between Anger/Frustration and ToM.  
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 88 children (40 females, 48 males) from a medium-sized city in 
the southwest of Germany were included in the final sample and tested at 18 
months (M = 18.20 months, SD = 0.42, range = 17.41 - 19.94 months) and 3 
years of age (M = 36.76 months, SD = 0.68, range = 36.07 – 39.69 months). 
Two additional children were excluded from analysis due to insufficient 
German language abilities. With regard to siblings, at 3 years of age, 32% of 
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the children were single children, 49% had one sibling, 16% had two siblings, 
and 3% had three siblings. According to parental report, 76% of the children 
were monolingual and 24% were bilingual (including 5.5% who were 
trilingual). Parental educational level was relatively high: 62.5% of mothers 
and 68% of fathers held a college or university degree, 20.5% of mothers and 
18% of fathers completed secondary school at top track (Abitur), and 17% of 
mothers and 12% of fathers completed secondary school at lower or middle 
track; 2% of fathers were without school qualification. 
Parents were recruited by telephone from a list of families who had 
earlier expressed interest in volunteering for research on child development. At 
each visit, they received a recompense for travel expenses and children were 
given a small gift and a certificate for participating. 
 
2.2 Tasks and materials 
2.2.1 Temperament 
To assess infant temperament parents completed the German version of 
the Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire (ECBQ, Putnam et al., 2006; 
Rink, 2006) at 18 months and the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ, 
Rothbart et al., 2001; Nikolaizig, 2007) at 3 years of age. For each item, 
parents were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = never, 7 = always), 
how frequent a specific infant behavior occurred during the preceding 1-2 
weeks at 18 months of age and during the last 6 months at 3 years of age, 
respectively. The ECBQ includes 18 subscales and the CBQ includes 15 
subscales. For both questionnaires, the same four subscales were focal to this 
study. As defined in the ECBQ and CBQ score sheets, Shyness characterizes a 
“slow or inhibited approach in social situations involving novelty or 
uncertainty” (e.g., “My child sometimes prefers to watch rather than join other 
children playing.”). Fear characterizes a “negative affect, including unease, 
worry or nervousness related to anticipated pain or distress and/or potentially 
threatening situations“ (e.g., “My child is afraid of the dark.”). Perceptual 
Sensitivity characterizes a “detection of slight, low intensity stimuli from the 
external environment“ (e.g., “My child seems to listen to even quiet sounds.”). 
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As the ECBQ and CBQ do not include aggressiveness, we focused also on 
Anger/Frustration, a defining component of aggression (Crick, Bigbee, & 
Howes, 1996). Anger/Frustration characterizes a “negative affect related to 
interruption of ongoing tasks or goal blocking.“ (e.g., “My child becomes 
easily frustrated when tired.”). To consider additionally temperament 
differences that assuming an emotional reactivity hypothesis should not be 
related to ToM, we included also Activity Level („level of gross motor activity 
including rate and extent of locomotion“), Attentional Focusing („tendency to 
maintain attentional focus upon task-related channels; resisting distraction“), 
and Inhibitory Control („capacity to plan and to suppress inappropriate 
approach responses under instructions or in novel or uncertain situations“) in 
our analyses (see also Lane et al., 2013, Wellman et al., 2011).  
2.2.2 Language 
When children were 18 months old, parents completed the 
“Elternfragebögen für die Früherkennung von Risikokindern“ (ELFRA-1, 
Parental questionnaire to identify children at risk for developmental language 
disorders, Grimm & Doil, 2006). Although the questionnaire is generally used 
to detect a delay in language development judged at critical values, it can also 
be used to assess the actual state of the infants’ language skills. The ELFRA-1 
assesses both the active and passive vocabulary of 12-18 month old children 
with 4 developmental scales: Word Production, Word Comprehension, 
Gestures and Fine Motor Skills. In the analyses, only the first two scales were 
included as the latter two scales serve as prognostic measures for language 
impairment. When children were 3 years old, we assessed their language 
abilities with the “Sprachentwicklungstest für Kinder“ (SETK) [Language 
Development Test for Children]. This German language development test for 
3- to 5-year-olds (Grimm, 2001) comprises six subscales. Each subscale 
assesses a specific aspect of children’s syntactic and morphological 
competences and yields subscale-specific standardized scores (T-values) as 
well as percentile ranks. Four subscales are administered to 3-year-old 
children: the Sentence Comprehension scale (sentences that differ in syntactic 
complexity), the Encoding of Semantic Relations scale (description of 
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interrelations between objects), the Phonological Memory scale (repetition of 
fantasy names), and the Morphological Rules scale (pluralization of familiar 
words). 
2.2.3 Theory of Mind scale 
The German version of the ToM scale (Hofer & Aschersleben, 2007) 
was employed to assess children’s ToM development. These five tasks were 
closely modeled to the original scale of Wellman and Liu (2004), assessing a 
range of different developmental attainments (diverse desires, diverse beliefs, 
knowledge access, contents false belief, and real–apparent emotion). These 
tasks have been shown to produce a coherent Guttman scale for typical 
preschoolers in the United States and China (Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 
2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004) as well as in Germany when the German version 
of this scale (Hofer & Aschersleben, 2007) was administered to a sample of 
107 German 3- to 5-year-olds (Kristen et al., 2006). Following the manual, for 
each task, laminated colored cards were used to illustrate a story about a 
protagonist (a toy figurine) and children were questioned about the 
protagonist’s mental state or action.  
Children’s ToM abilities at 3 years were assessed employing the 
German version of the ToM scale (Hofer & Aschersleben, 2007). As children 
in the current study were tested in the first weeks after their third birthday and 
given that earlier studies (Henning et al., 2011; Kristen et al., 2006) reported 
floor effects in the last two of the five tasks for this age group, only the first 
three tasks were administered. In the Divergent Desires task, the child needs to 
differentiate his or her own desire (e.g., preference for a cookie over a carrot) 
from another person’s differing desire about the same food items (e.g., 
preference for a carrot) to correctly predict the other person’s snack choice 
(e.g., the carrot and not the cookie). In the Diverse Beliefs task, the child needs 
to differentiate his or her own belief about the location of an object (e.g., the 
cat is hiding in the bush) from another person’s differing belief about the 
location of same object (e.g., the cat is hiding in the garage) to correctly predict 
the other person’s action (e.g., look for the cat in the garage). The Knowledge 
Access task requires an understanding of the causal relation between seeing 
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and knowing. In this task, the child is first shown the content of a box (toy 
figurine) and then asked to judge whether another person who did not have 
visual access to the content of the box, knows the content of the box. All tasks 
include a focal test question. The Knowledge Access task also includes a 
memory control question to ensure that children remembered that the 
protagonist had never looked into the box. Following Wellman and Liu (2004), 
tasks were administered in a fixed order with increasing degree of difficulty: 
diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access. 
2.3 Procedure 
Children were tested in a laboratory room. At 18 months of age, the 
ELFRA-1 questionnaires were mailed to parents together with the ECBQ, 1-2 
weeks prior to the respective test session. At test scheduling, the primary 
caregiver was advised to fill out the questionnaires and to hand them back to 
the experimenter at testing. At 3 years of age, procedure was the same for the 
CBQ. Administration of the SETK 3-5 and the ToM scale took place in a quiet 
test room with the experimenter and the child sitting at a table. The SETK 3-5 
was administered prior to the ToM scale. 
2.4 Scoring  
2.4.1 Temperament.  
The average score for each of the subscales was calculated for parents’ 
ratings at each visit. At 3 years of age, the temperament data from one child 
was excluded because the parents did not complete the CBQ.  
2.4.2 Language development.  
As a measure of language ability at 18 months of age, a Word 
Production score was computed by summarizing the scores of the subscales 
productive vocabulary and speech sounds. Also a Word Comprehension score 
was computed by summarizing the scores of the subscales receptive vocabulary 
and reactions to sounds. The data from one child was missing because parents 
did not hand back the ELFRA-1. 
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As a measure of language ability at 3 years of age, a total mean T-score 
(M = 50.00, SD = 10.00) of the four SETK subscales was used for analyses. 
The SETK data for all subscales of two children were excluded, because the 
testing had to be aborted already during or after the administration of the first 
subscale. The data on phonological memory of 16 children were excluded due 
to children’s refusal to participate (n = 12) or uneasiness (n = 4). The data on 
morphological rules of 8 children were excluded due to children’s refusal to 
participate. 
 
2.4.3 Theory of Mind scale.  
Children needed to answer the focal test question, as well as the control 
question in task 3 (“Has the protagonist ever looked into the box?”), to count as 
passing this task. All children that failed this control question (n = 27) also 
failed the test question. For each of the tasks, children received a 0 (fail) or a 1 
(pass). The resulting ToM total score ranged between 0 (no task solved) and 3 
(all tasks solved). Please note, that no false-belief task was administered here. 
3 Results 
In the following sections, we will first describe the main results 
obtained for each measure separately and then focus on the main question 
regarding a relation between infant temperament and early ToM capacities at 
age 3. In addition to significant results (p < .05), marginally significant results 
(.05 < p < .06) and trends (.06 < p < .10) are reported as well. Effect sizes are 
reported as f with the ranges small: .10 ≤ f < .25, medium: .25 ≤ f < .40, and 
large: f ≥ .40 (Cohen, 1988). 
Preliminary analyses 
As 24% of the children were bilingual, their SETK and ToM 
performance was compared to that of monolingual children. Bilingual children 
(M = 43.89, SE = 13.2) had a significantly lower SETK Total score than 
monolingual children (M = 51.42, SE = 7.09), t(1,84) = 3.31, p = .001, but 
ToM scale scores did not differ between these groups (p> .70). 
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3.1 Temperament 
Table 6 displays descriptive information regarding parental ratings of 
infant and child temperament at 18 months and 3 years of age. Additionally, it 
displays Pearson product-moment correlations (or Spearman Rho if scales were 
not normally distributed) that were computed to assess the stability of infant 
temperament ratings and paired t-tests (or Wilcoxon tests) to assess 
developmental change. Scale results indicated moderate to high normative 
stability in parental temperament ratings from 18 months to 3 years (rs between 
.226 and .562, ps < .02, for Fear, rsp = .186, p = .086; see Table 6). In addition, 
scores significantly increased from 18 months to 3 years for Attention 
Focusing, Fear, Frustration, Inhibitory Control, and Perceptual Sensitivity (ps < 
.001; see Table 6). No significant change was observed for Activity Level and 
Shyness (ps > .33). 
Table 6: Parental Temperament ratings at ages 18 months and 3 years 
 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of parental temperament ratings at 
ages 18 months (n=88) and 3 years (n=87) and their longitudinal correlations 
ECBQ/CBQ 
subscales 
 M (SD) 
 Number 
of items 
18 months 3 years r t/Z 
Activity 
Level a) 
12 / 13 4.92 (.84) 5.00 (.73) .357*** -.969 
Attention 
Focusing a) 
12 / 14 4.08 (.92) 4.58 (0.62) .301** -4.534*** 
Fear a) 11 / 12 2.05 (.62) 3.42 (.93) .186+ -7.658*** 
Frustration / 
Anger 
12 / 13 3.42 (.92) 4.26 (.92) .562*** -9.088*** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
12 / 13 3.46 (.95) 4.57 (.84) .540*** -11.960*** 
Perceptual 
Sensitivity 
12 / 12 4.69 (.96) 5.51 (.66) .226* -7.185*** 
Shyness a) 12 / 13 3.12 (.96) 3.27 (1.15) .446*** -.817 
Note. a) Scales are not normally distributed at 18 months why non-parametric 
comparisons were used. Sample sizes for correlations ranged between n = 69 
and n = 87. +p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. All ps two-tailed. 
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Gender differences were found in only few of the temperament 
characteristics. At 18 months of age, ANOVAS revealed differences in 
Inhibitory Control, F(1,86) = 4.72, p = .033, f = .23, Frustration, F(1,86) = 
4.36, p = .040, f = .22, and Perceptual Sensitivity, F(1,85) = 2.87, p = .094, f = 
.18. Girls (M = 3.69, SE = .15) were rated as possessing more inhibitory control 
than boys (M = 3.26, SE = .13). Also, boys (M = 3.60, SE = .13) were rated as 
showing more negative affect when being frustrated than girls (M = 3.20, SE = 
.14), and boys (M = 4.85, SE = .13) were rated as being more perceptually 
sensitive than girls (M = 4.51, SE = .16). At 3 years of age, results revealed 
differences in Inhibitory Control, F(1,85) = 4.11, p = .046, f = .22. Again, girls 
(M = 4.77, SE = .12) were rated as possessing more inhibitory control than 
boys (M = 4.41, SE = .13).  
3.2 Theory of Mind 
The ToM scale score ranged from 0 to 3 (M = 1.25, SD = 0.81, n = 88). 
Eighteen children (20.5%) did not pass any ToM task, 32 (36.5%) children 
passed one task, 36 children (41%) passed two tasks and two children (2%) 
passed all three tasks (see Table 7 for rate of success in single tasks). No 
gender difference was found in the total ToM scale score (p > .79). 
Table 7: Theory of Mind performance at 3 years of age 
 
Frequencies (and percentages) of children who passed the individual ToM 
tasks (n=88) 
ToM Scale n 
Diverse Desires 57 (64.8%) 
Diverse Beliefs 47 (53.4%) 
Knowledge Access 6 (6.8%) 
 
3.3 Language  
At 18 months of age, the ELFRA-1 Production score ranged from 7 to 
134 (M = 42.26, SD = 30.21, n = 86), the Comprehension score ranged from 30 
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to 171 (M = 122.71, SD = 31.31, n = 85). The data of one child was excluded in 
word production because of an extreme value (167 words) that was 3 standard 
deviations above the mean value. A gender difference was found in the 
Production score, F(1,84) = 16.54, p < .001, f = .44, but not in the 
Comprehension score (p > .56). Girls (M = 56.03, SE = 5.84) were rated as 
having a greater active vocabulary than boys (M = 31.35, SE = 2.80).  
At 3 years of age, children’s T-values were in the normal range of 
language development on the four subscales of the SETK 3–5: Sentence 
Comprehension score (M = 50.04, SD = 9.01, range 29 – 71, n = 85), Encoding 
of Semantic Relations score (M = 53.47, SD = 9.79, range 32 – 75, n = 85), 
Phonological Memory score (M = 47.43, SD = 9.81, range 29 – 67, n = 72), 
and Morphological Rules score (M = 50.11, SD = 10.68, range 33 – 72, n = 
80). The SETK total score ranged from 34.5 to 68.25 (M = 49.75, SD = 9.21). 
No gender differences were found (ps > .17).  
Spearman Rho correlations revealed a stability of language abilities 
across the two visits: both the ELFRA-1 Production score (rsp = .369) and the 
Comprehension score (rsp = .302) were related to the SETK total score (ps < 
.005). No significant relation between any of the language scores and the ToM 
scale score was found (ps > .70). 
3.4 Siblings and Theory of Mind 
The presence or absence of siblings was not significantly related with 
the ToM scale score (p = .778). Also, there was no significant relation between 
the number of siblings, or number of only older siblings, and children’s 
performance on the ToM scale (ps > .69). 
3.5 Parental education and Theory of Mind 
Neither maternal nor paternal educational level was significantly related 
with the ToM scale score (p = .660 and p = .746, respectively). Additionally, 
there was no difference in ToM performance between children who’s mothers 
or fathers had higher education (Abitur or university degree) compared to a 
lower educational level (ps = .66). 
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3.6 Temperament and Theory of Mind 
Pearson or Spearman’s Rho correlations were performed to assess 
whether temperament was related to early ToM abilities at 3 years. Two of the 
seven ECBQ-subscales were found to be correlated with the ToM scale score: 
Shyness (rsp = .297, p = .005) at 18 months was positively related to ToM, 
whereas Activity Level (rsp = -.248, p = .020) at 18 months was negatively 
related to ToM. Cross-sectionally, also two CBQ-subscales were found to be 
correlated with the ToM scale score: Attention Focusing (rsp = .261, p = .015), 
and Shyness (rsp = .185, p = .086) at 3 years were positively correlated to ToM, 
although shyness only revealed a trend. 
To accurately assess the contribution of temperament to early ToM 
development at 3 years, we ran two different multiple regression analyses 
simultaneously including all seven temperament characteristics, one for each 
age in order to preclude multicollinearity.  
At 18 months, Shyness and Activity Level significantly predicted ToM, 
F(7,78) = 2.57, p = .020, accounting for 19% of the variance in early ToM 
abilities (see Table 8, Model A). Consistent with prior findings, higher Shyness 
was associated with better early ToM abilities, and higher Activity Level was 
Table 8: Relations between children’s temperament and their Theory of mind 
abilities at 3 years of age 
 
 early ToM abilities 
predictors B SE B β 
 Model A: Temperament at 18 months, n = 86 
Shyness .259 0.099 .309* 
Activity Level -.320 0.110 -.336* 
 Model B: Temperament at 3 years, n = 87 
Shyness .160 0.073 .230* 
Attention Focusing .348 0.135 .270* 
Note. * p < .05 
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associated with poorer early ToM abilities. At 3 years, the model including all 
7 temperament characteristics was not significant, so we ran a model with only 
Shyness and Attention Focusing that correlated with ToM. Shyness and 
Attention Focusing significantly predicted ToM, F(2,84) = 4.92, p = .010, 
accounting for 10.5% of the variance in early ToM abilities (see Table 8, 
Model B). Higher Shyness and Attention Focusing was associated with better 
early ToM abilities.  
In two hierarchical regression analyses, one for each age, we assessed 
the relation between temperament and ToM controlling for other influences. At 
step 1, gender, language abilities, number of siblings and maternal education 
were entered, then at step 2, the 7 temperament characteristics. In both models, 
the additional control variables did not explain a significant portion of the 
variance of the ToM scale score. At 18 months, the R of the overall model was 
significantly different from zero, F(7,68) = 2.352, p = .033, R2 = .20. Still, only 
Shyness (B = .28, t = 2.48, p = .015) and Activity Level (B = -.31, t = -2.61, p = 
.011) were significantly related to ToM. The unique contributions to the total 
variance of the ToM scale score were 7.2% for Shyness and 8% for Activity 
Level (indicated by squared part correlations sr2). At 3 years, the overall model 
was not significantly different from zero (p = .75) and the relations between 
ToM and Shyness (B = .16, t = 1.79, p = .078) as well as Attention Focusing (B 
= .33, t = 1.70, p = .093) were only a trend. 
Following Banerjee and Henderson (2001) and Wellman and colleagues 
(2011), we also added some temperamental interaction effects, shy-fearful and 
shy-angry temperament, in a regression analysis, but this, too, had no further 
predicting effect on ToM.  
To control beyond, if the reported relations between temperament and 
ToM were special for social cognition and that there were no relations to a non-
social cognition task, we assessed the relation between temperament and 
language abilities. Attention Focusing (rsp = .221, p = .041) at 18 months was 
positively related to the SETK total score, whereas Fear (r = -.291, p = .007) at 
18 months was negatively related to the SETK total score. No relations were 
found for temperament at 3 years (ps > .20). In sum, there were no relations 
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found between language and the ToM-related temperament characteristics 
Shyness and Activity Level. Only Attention Focusing seemed to be important 
for both, non-social as well as social cognition, as Attention Focusing at 18 
months was related to language and Attention Focusing at 3 years to ToM.  
4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to longitudinally examine the impact 
of infant temperament at 18 months of age on Theory of Mind development in 
children at 3 years of age. The main findings showed that children rated as 
shyer and less active at the end of infancy, showed a better ToM understanding 
one and a half years later. Also, children rated as shyer and more attentionally 
focused at 3 years, showed a better ToM performance. The findings extend 
previous work by suggesting a relation between individual differences in 
temperament and ToM development well before the emergence of false belief 
understanding.  
Theory of Mind. Children’s performance on the first three tasks of the 
ToM scale replicated previous patterns of results suggesting a developmental 
progression from understanding discrepant desires to understanding discrepant 
beliefs (Henning et al., 2011; Kristen et al., 2006). Also consistent with this 
previous work (Henning et al., 2011; Kristen et al., 2006 for Order 1), the 
majority of 3-year-olds did not consider visual access when asked about the 
story character’s knowledge about the content of a box (knowledge access). In 
fact, while about two-thirds of the children understood discrepant desires and 
about half of them understood discrepant beliefs, only six children passed the 
knowledge access task. This great drop in success rate may be explained by 
differences between tasks in the role of the actual state of affairs in relation to 
the mental state reasoned about. According to Searle (1983), epistemic states 
such as beliefs have a mind-to-world fit (i.e., the belief may be at fault, but not 
the world), whereas desires and volitional states have a world-to-mind fit (i.e., 
the world may be at fault in that it does not comply with or fulfill the desire or 
volitional state). In all three tasks employed here, the child needs to understand 
the subjectivity of mental states (the child’s desire, belief or knowledge state 
differs from that of the story character). However, only in the knowledge 
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access task is the child also required to understand that this difference results 
from a difference in experience of – or relation to – the real state of affairs (a 
toy figurine in the box; please note that in the discrepant belief task no 
information is given on the actual hiding place of the cat). Overall, the average 
scores on the ToM scale were below the performance of 3-year-olds reported in 
other German samples (Henning et al., 2011; Kristen et al., 2006). Binomial 
tests for each task revealed that only in the first task performance is 
significantly above chance level (p = .007). This discrepancy can be explained 
by differences in average age and age range. Whereas the average age in the 
two previous German studies was 43 and 42 months, respectively, children 
were on average 37 months old in the current study. Also, while children’s age 
in the previous samples ranged up to 3 years and 9-11 months, children in the 
current sample were tested around their third birthday.  
Temperament. Parental ratings of child temperament showed both 
stability and changes from second to third year of life. Correlation coefficients 
for 6 out of the 7 considered temperament subscales, ranged between .23 and 
.56, indicating moderate to high normative stability in infant temperament 
between 18 and 36 months of age. Overall, and consistent with Putnam and 
colleagues (Putnam, Rothbart, & Gartstein, 2008), results indicate a continuity 
of temperament from infancy to early childhood. In addition to the reported 
moderate to high normative stability, there were significant changes in average 
ratings for 5 out of the 7 subscales suggesting that the temperament domains 
considered here are also subject to developmental change between 18 and 36 
months of age. There was a significant increase in the ratings for Attention 
Focusing, Fear, Frustration, Inhibitory Control, and Perceptual Sensitivity. No 
change was observed in the ratings for Activity Level and Shyness. Saudino 
and Cherny (2001) discuss genetic factors as well as new nonshared 
environmental influences as possible factors that might have an impact on 
developmental change at this age. One should also keep in mind that the 
observation window differs respectably between the ECBQ (2 weeks) and the 
CBQ (6 months). Hence, it is more likely to observe a specific behavior when 
the observation window is longer, which might also explain the overall 
increase in means between visits. 
STUDY 2     82 
 
 
Influence of temperament on ToM. Correlational analyses as well as 
confirmatory regression analyses showed that Shyness at 18 months as well as 
at 3 years of age was positively related to children’s performance on the ToM 
scale at 3 years. Children rated by their parents as shy were better in reasoning 
about others’ mental states. These results are consistent with those found by 
Wellman and colleagues (2011) who postulate that shyness in terms of a more 
quietly observant stance towards human interactions yield to a better insight 
into interpersonal processes. 
Different to Wellman and colleagues (2011) we did not find a relation 
between Perceptual Sensitivity and ToM nor between aggressiveness and ToM. 
It is possible that Perceptual Sensitivity becomes more important for an 
observational attitude in interactions later in preschool age, or that it is more 
strongly related to the understanding of false-belief tasks and therefore 
contributes only little to early ToM understanding at the age of 3. Additionally, 
the lack of a relation between aggressiveness and ToM in our study might be 
explained by the fact, that we only investigated one component of 
aggressiveness, namely Anger, but no other component as for example harmful 
behavior towards others.  
Furthermore, analyses showed that Activity Level at 18 months was 
negatively related to children’s performance on the ToM scale at 3 years. As 
this relation was only found for Activity Level at 18 months, but not at 3 years, 
we inspected the Activity Level scores at both ages more thoroughly and 
conducted further analyses. The Activity Level scores scattered more at 18 
months and there were four extreme values that differed more than 2 standard 
deviations from the mean value. By omitting these four scores from analysis, 
the correlation between Activity Level at 18 months and ToM at 3 years was 
no longer significant (rsp = -.179, p = .102; n=84). Hence, the relation between 
Activity Level and ToM is not a meaningful one and will not be further 
discussed. 
Moreover, analyses showed that Attention Focusing at 3 years of age 
was positively related to children’s performance on the ToM scale. However, 
as we also found relations between Attention Focusing and language abilities, 
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Attention Focusing might not be an influencing factor specific to social-
cognitive abilities but rather influences cognitive development per se. 
Influence of siblings, parental education and language on ToM. In 
addition to investigating the influence of child temperament on children’s early 
ToM abilities, we controlled for three further factors – siblings, parental 
education and language abilities – that are thought to influence ToM 
development. Previous research pointed to a beneficial effect of siblings (e.g., 
Cassidy et al., 2005; Ruffman et al., 1998), maternal education (e.g., Cutting & 
Dunn, 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003) as well as language (e.g., Milligan et al., 
2007).  
In the current study, the presence and number of siblings as well as the 
presence of one or more older siblings did not have a positive effect on 
children’s ToM development. An explanation for the absence of a sibling effect 
in our study might be that the children were simply too young. Ruffman and 
colleagues (Ruffman et al., 1998) reported that children younger than 39 
months were not able to benefit from their siblings regarding belief 
understanding. In our sample children averaged only 36.7 months. Following 
their argument, it is likely that children have to reach a certain precondition 
before siblings can exert a positive influence on them. This precondition might 
be maturational readiness, knowledge acquired through learning, a certain 
threshold of interaction or a change in interaction among siblings due to 
children’s maturation (Ruffman et al., 1998). 
Neither maternal nor paternal education had an impact on ToM 
development in the current study. In sum, parental educational level in our 
sample was relatively high with 83% of mothers and 86% of fathers holding 
Abitur or a college or university degree, what leaded to restricted variance. But 
also, maybe the social interactions in these families did not substantially differ 
from families whose parents had a lower educational level and therefore, 
children did not show differences in ToM development. Still, the current 
findings are consistent with some previous studies that did not find a relation 
between maternal education and ToM (Dunn et al., 1991; Ruffman et al., 
1999). 
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Similarly, in the current study there was no evidence for an influence of 
language abilities on ToM development, neither longitudinally at 18 months of 
age nor cross-sectionally at 3 years of age. This finding, however, is in line 
with earlier studies that also found no correlation between ToM and language 
abilities (Aschersleben et al., 2008; Thoermer et al., 2012; Wellman et al., 
2004; Wellman et al., 2008). Thus evidence concerning the relation between 
language abilities and ToM competencies is somewhat inconsistent and further 
research is needed to clarify this point. 
In summary, our results extend earlier findings by Wellman and 
colleagues (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) who demonstrated that 
certain temperament factors reflecting social-emotional reactivity predict 
children’s ToM development from early childhood to preschool age. In the 
current work, such a relationship was even found from infancy to early 
childhood, but only for Shyness. As Shyness was not related to language 
abilities, the reported relations between Shyness and ToM likely are specific 
for social-cognitive development, and do not hold for cognitive development in 
general. It seems that, observant attitude children benefit in their social-
cognitive development despite—or perhaps precisely because of— this kind of 
passive attitude. Lane and colleagues (2013) argue that even though shy or 
withdrawn children may not actively participate in social interactions, they still 
learn from them by merely attending to them. Additionally, ToM development 
is by default assessed via cognitive insights into other’s mental states and is not 
assessed in ongoing interactions with others where children have to use their 
social-cognitive skills (Wellman et al., 2011). 
In sum, there is evidence that shyness fosters the social-cognitive 
development already in infancy. Even at this young age, and well before the 
emergence of false belief understanding, inferences about ToM development 
from individual differences in temperament can be drawn. 
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Study 3 – Dropout in visual habituation paradigms: 
The role of temperament 
The first aim of this study was to assess whether dropout rates in two 
visual habituation tasks varied as a function of individual differences in infant 
temperament assessed at 6 and 12 months of age. To the best of our 
knowledge, all previous studies examining the influence of temperament on 
dropout rate were cross-sectional. The second aim of this longitudinal work 
was therefore to assess stability of infant temperament as well as stability of 
dropout rate by employing the same tasks at each age tested. The third aim was 
to assess whether dropout rates differed as a function of specific content of the 
task. The two visual habituation tasks employed in the present study only 
differed in content while experimental set-up and procedure were kept constant 
across tasks. In addition, we explored whether dropout rates differed as a 
function of temporal order of tasks. Finally, given that previous work points to 
a possible effect of temperament in interaction with infant gender on task 
performance, infant gender was included into the analyses. 
Infants were invited to the lab when they were 6 and 12 months old and 
tested in two visual habituation experiments, one on perception of human goal-
directed behavior and one on perception of physical causality. At both age 
points, parents rated their infants’ temperament by completing the IBQ-R prior 
to testing. Based on previous studies (Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007), we 
expected a moderate number of dropouts in the current sample. Also based on 
previous work (Carranza Carnicero et al., 2000), we predicted a general 
stability of temperament across the two age points as well as an impact on 
dropout of the temperamental domains Distress to Limitations, Duration of 
Orienting and Activity Level. Distress to Limitations includes fussing and 
crying while being motor constrained or frustrated. As in habituation 
experiments infants are typically held on their parents’ lap or placed in a baby 
seat, we predicted non-completers to have higher scores in Distress to 
Limitations than completers. Duration of Orienting serves as an indicator for 
infant attention to a specific object or event which is the behavior assessed in 
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looking time tasks. Thus, we predicted completers to have higher scores in this 
subscale compared to non-completers. Finally, since an increased Activity 
Level seems to have an impact on dropout (Miceli et al., 1998; Treiber, 1984), 
we predicted a higher dropout rate at 12 months of age, when infants have 
progressed in their motor development, as compared to 6 months. Given the 
exploratory nature of the study with regard to content of task and temporal 
order of tasks, no specific predictions were made.  
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 80 infants (34 females, 46 males) were included in the final 
sample and tested at 6 months (M = 190.73 days, SD = 8.27, range = 159-213 
days) and 12 months (M = 364.33 days, SD = 11.58, range = 324-397 days) of 
age. An additional 11 infants participated in the study but were excluded 
because one of the two habituation tasks could not be administered to infants 
due to fussiness (n = 4), or because parents did not complete the temperament 
questionnaire for one of the two age points (n = 7). The data from further 22 
infants were excluded because the number of missing items (no response to the 
item) in the questionnaire exceeded 25% or because the number of items that 
were reported as not applicable exceeded 50% in at least one subscale. With 
regard to siblings, 52.5% of the children were single children, 32.5% had one 
sibling, and 15.0% had two or more siblings. Participants came from a 
medium-sized city and surroundings in the southwest of Germany, were 
predominantly Caucasian and from middle-class backgrounds. Paternal 
educational level was relatively high: 60% of both mothers and fathers held a 
college or university degree, 21.3% of mothers and 20% of fathers completed 
secondary school at top track (Abitur), and 18.7% of mothers and 20% of 
fathers completed secondary school at lower or middle track.  
Parents were recruited by telephone from a list of families who had 
earlier expressed interest in volunteering for research on infant development. 
At each visit, they received a recompense for travel expenses and infants were 
given a small gift and a certificate for participating.  
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2.2 Tasks and materials 
2.2.1 Temperament 
To assess infant temperament parents completed the German version of 
the Revised Infant Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ-R, Gartstein & Rothbart, 
2003; Kristen, Eisenbeis, Thoermer, & Sodian, 2007) at both age points. 
Questionnaires were mailed to parents 1-2 weeks prior to the respective test 
session. At test scheduling, the primary caregiver was advised to fill out the 
questionnaires and to hand them back to the experimenter at testing. The IBQ-
R includes the following 14 scales: Activity Level (15 items), Distress to 
Limitations (16 items), Fear (16 items), Duration of Orienting (12 items), 
Smiling and Laughter (10 items), High Pleasure (11 items), Low Pleasure (13 
items), Soothability (18 items), Falling Reactivity/Rate of recovery from 
distress (13 items), Cuddliness (17 items), Perceptual Sensitivity (12 items), 
Sadness (14 items), Approach (12 items) and Vocal Reactivity (12 items). For 
each item, parents were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale, how frequent a 
specific infant behavior occurred during the preceding 1-2 weeks (1 = never, 7 
= always).  
2.2.2 Visual habituation tasks 
At both age points, infant perception of human goal-directed action 
(Back-of-Hand task, BoH) as well as their perception of physical causality in a 
collision event (Causality task, Caus) was assessed employing a visual 
habituation paradigm. In addition to the two habituation tasks, infant motor and 
cognitive development was assessed with the Bayley Scales and mother-infant-
interaction was recorded during a 5-minute free play (the latter two 
assessments will not be further discussed in the current study). The cognitive 
scale of the Bayley Scales and the free play were always administered in 
between the two habituation tasks such that the two habituation tasks were 
never presented consecutively. There were two orders of tasks: 44 infants at 6 
months and 37 infants at 12 months saw the BoH task first (BoH first), and 36 
infants at 6 months and 43 infants at 12 months saw the Caus task first (Caus 
first). The presentation order of the two habituation tasks was counterbalanced 
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across age points. Testing sessions lasted between 60-90 minutes, with each 
single habituation task amounting to about 10 minutes of testing time. The first 
habituation task was conducted circa 10 minutes after beginning of testing 
(second task), the second habituation task was conducted circa 45 minutes after 
beginning of testing (fifth task). 
 
Figure 6: Setup of the visual habituation tasks.  
 
Back-of-Hand task. The same video clips as in Hofer and colleagues’ 
(Hofer et al., 2008) adaption of the Woodward paradigm (1999) were used (see 
Figure 7). There were four action clips and two reversed-position clips without 
action. In each action clip, an arm appeared from behind a curtain at the right 
side of a stage, lowered its hand with the palm facing up onto one of two 
objects positioned side-by-side on the front part of the stage (duck and tower), 
then pushed the target object smoothly to the back of the stage and came to a 
halt. The four action clips differed with regard to the target object chosen (duck  
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a)  
b)           c)  
Figure 7: Back-of-Hand Task.  
a) Habituation phase b) Path change test event c) Object change test event. 
or tower) and the position of the target object (left or right). In the habituation 
phase, infants were presented with one of the four action clips (e.g., displacing 
the duck on the right). The habituation phase was infant-controlled and lasted 
between a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 14 trials. Each trial ended as soon 
as the infant looked away for 2 seconds or after 60 seconds had elapsed (also in 
test phase). The criterion was computed relative to the sum of the preceding 
three trials and was reached when infants’ total looking time in one trial 
decreased below 50% of the sum of the preceding three trials (i.e., floating-
point 50% decrement criterion). After the last habituation trial, infants saw one 
of the reversed-position clips (object positions reversed compared to 
habituation, no action) in order to familiarize with the new arrangement. In the 
test phase, infants saw a path change test event and an object change test event, 
each for three times in an alternating order. In the path change test event (e.g., 
displacing the duck on the left), the hand’s back pushed the same target object 
as during habituation but due to the change in object positions, the arm took a 
different movement trajectory. In the object change test event (e.g., displacing 
the tower on the right), the arm performed the same trajectory as during 
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habituation but contacted and pushed the other object that had previously not 
been the target. Action clip conditions and order of test trials were 
counterbalanced across infants. 
Causality task. The same collision event videos were used as in 
Hohenberger, Elsabbagh, Serres, de Schoenen, Karmiloff-Smith, and 
Aschersleben (2012), which were closely modeled to the looking-time task 
developed by Kotovsky and Baillargeon (1994, 1998). The stimuli were 
computer generated color film clips (2D flash animation) showing a ramp and a 
horizontal track with three stylized houses in the background (see Figure 8). In 
the habituation clip, a middle-sized blue ball rolled down the ramp, hit a 
middle-sized red ball, causing it to roll along the track and stop in front of the 
middle house. In the possible test event, a big yellow ball rolled down the 
ramp, hit the red ball that then rolled along the track to the end of the display. 
In the impossible test event, a small orange ball rolled down the ramp, hit the 
red ball that then rolled along the track to the end of the display. The possible 
 
a)  
b)         c)  
Figure 8: Causality Task. 
a) Habituation phase. b) Consistent test event. c) Inconsistent test event. 
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and the impossible test event were presented each for three times in an 
alternating order. Order of test trials was counterbalanced across infants. 
Maximum number of habituation trials, habituation criterion, maximum length 
of trial, and looking time criteria were the same as in the BoH task. The only 
procedural difference was the additional reverse position trial in the BoH task. 
2.2.3 Procedure 
The test room was unfurnished except for the test equipment. Infants sat 
on their parent’s lap in front of a table (60 x 110 cm) facing a 16” Apple 
computer screen (distance 70 cm). Black curtains were draped around the 
screen so that only the monitor was visible for the participants. Parents were 
instructed not to interact with their infants and to look down on infants’ heads 
throughout the presentation of the video action clips. The video presentation 
and the succession of trials were controlled by the computer program Habit 
2000 on a Mac OS 9.2. The whole procedure was controlled by a trained 
experimenter who observed the infants’ looking behavior from behind the 
curtains. Test sessions were videotaped for later offline coding. 
To shorten testing time, number of trials in the habituation phase was 
reduced to 6 trials in the course of the study. At the same time, number of test 
trials was increased to 8 trials. Thirty-seven out of 80 infants were tested using 
this altered procedure at 6 months and 45 infants at 12 months. Groups did not 
differ in dropout rate (p > .11 and p > .22 for 6 and 12 months, respectively). 
As to temperament, groups significantly differed in Cuddliness (p = .020) and 
Approach (p = .026) at 6 months of age and in Activity Level (p = .011) and 
Distress to Limitations (p = .016) at 12 months of age. However, a Fisher’s 
omnibus test run on the 24 p-values indicated that the statistical significance of 
these four tests likely resulted by chance (Haccou & Meelis, 1994). Hence, 
data were collapsed for subsequent analyses. 
2.3 Scoring 
2.3.1 Temperament 
STUDY 3    92 
 
 
According to the scoring procedure of the IBQ-R (Rothbart & 
Gartstein, 2000), scores for each subscale were averaged by dividing the total 
by the number of items receiving a numerical response. Parents seemed to have 
difficulties in responding to the scales Perceptual Sensitivity and Falling 
Reactivity. For Perceptual Sensitivity, parents responded with “does not apply” 
to more than 50% of the items for 10 infants at 6 months and 2 infants at 12 
months. For Falling Reactivity, parents responded with “does not apply” to 
more than 50% of the items for 2 infants at 6 months and 2 infants at 12 
months. Due to the relatively high number of missing values, the data 
pertaining to these two scales were excluded from analyses, except for the 
factor analyses to compare results with Gartstein and Rothbart (2003) and 
Vonderlin and colleagues (2012).  
 
2.3.2 Visual habituation tasks 
Looking times. Two trained coders recoded infant looking times in the 
habituation and test trials offline from the video recordings. Note that in the 
BoH task, as durations of reaching to the object differed slightly between test 
events as a function of position of the object, infant looking times in test trials 
were counted once the hand had contacted the object. Intra-class correlation 
revealed an inter-observer reliability for looking durations in the BoH task of r 
= .963 and r = .997, and in the Caus task of r = .956 and r = .971 (all ps < .001) 
at 6 and 12 months of age, respectively. Looking time analyses were not within 
the scope of this work and are thus not reported in the following. 
Dropout. If infants showed excessive fussiness or crying during the 
habituation task, the task was aborted by the experimenter. These infants were 
assigned to the group of non-completers in the present study regardless of the 
abort’s moment in experiment (habituation vs. test phase). 
3 Results 
3.1 Strategy of Data Analysis   
The main objective of this study was to investigate the impact of 
individual differences in various temperamental dimensions on the dropout rate 
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in two different visual habituation tasks. First, chi2-tests were conducted to 
check for differences in dropout rate between boys and girls as well as between 
the two habituation tasks. Second, temporal stability of dropout rate in the 
habituation tasks was assessed via McNemar-tests. In order to compare the 
present data to another German sample (Vonderlin et al., 2012) a factor 
analysis was carried out on the IBQ-R scales for each age point. Following 
Carranza and colleagues (Carranza Carnicero et al., 2000), both stability in 
parental ratings of infant temperament as well as developmental change were 
assessed. Stability of the IBQ-R scales was reviewed via Pearson product-
moment correlations and developmental changes were reviewed via paired t-
tests or Wilcoxon-tests if data were not normally distributed. To test whether 
dropout was systematically related to temperament when taken temporal 
position of the respective task into account, point-biserial correlations were 
conducted between temperament and dropout separately for each age point and 
each temporal position of task. Please note that here order of tasks (BoH first, 
Caus first) was not of interest but correlations between 1) temperament and 
dropout in the first task administered to the infant, and between 2) 
temperament and dropout in the second task administered. Finally, four 
multivariate analyses of variance were conducted, one for each experiment and 
age point, with mean scores of the 12 IBQ-R scales and the dimensions as 
dependent variables, and with dropout (yes, no), infant gender (boys, girls), and 
order of tasks (BoH first, Caus first) as independent factors. In case of 
significant interaction effects, linear contrasts were conducted to test the 
significance of the single effects. In addition to significant results (p < .05), 
marginally significant results (.05 < p < .06) and trends (.06 < p < .10) are 
reported as well. Effect sizes are reported as f with the ranges small: .10 ≤ f < 
.25, medium: .25 ≤ f < .40, and large: f ≥ .40 (Cohen, 1988).  
3.2 Dropout 
Dropout in the present sample ranged from 21% in both tasks at 12 
months to 42% in the Caus task and 68% in the BoH task at 6 months. Table 9 
displays number of infants completing and not completing each of the two 
visual habituation experiments at 6 and 12 months of age, separated by gender 
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and order of tasks. There was no difference in dropout rate between boys and 
girls (p > .17). At the age of 6 months, there were more non-completers in the 
BoH task compared to the Caus task (χ2= 9.80, p = .002). At the age of 12 
months, there were overall more completers than non-completers in both 
experiments (χ2 = 26.45, p < .001). Two McNemar-Tests, one conducted for 
each habituation task, revealed no stability of dropout between 6 and 12 
months (BoH: p < .001, Caus: p = .006). For both experiments, there were 
more infants who were non-completers at 6 months and completers at 12 
months of age than vice versa. 
 
Table 9: Number of completers in the two habituation experiments 
 
Absolute (and relative) frequencies of infants completing and not completing 
the experiment for each of the two visual habituation experiments at 6 and 12 
months of age, separated by gender and order of tasks (n= 80). 
 Completer Non-Completer 
 BoH first Caus first BoH first Caus first 
 BoH 6 months 
Male 10 (13%) 5 (6%) 15 (19%) 16 (20%) 
Female 7 (9%) 4 (5%) 12 (15%) 11 (14%) 
 Caus 6 months 
Male 13 (16%) 14 (18%) 12 (15%) 7 (9%) 
Female 9 (11%) 11 (14%) 10 (13%) 4 (5%) 
 BoH 12 months 
Male 19 (24%) 16 (20%) 2 (3%) 9 (11%) 
Female 15 (19%) 13 (16%) 1 (1%) 5 (6%) 
 Caus 12 months 
Male 15 (19%) 20 (25%) 6 (8%) 5 (6%) 
Female 15 (19%) 13 (16%) 1 (1%) 5 (6%) 
Note. BoH = experiment to test perception of goal-directed human action. Caus = experiment 
to test perception of physical causality. 
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3.3 Temperament 
Table 10 displays descriptive information regarding parental ratings of 
infant temperament at 6 and 12 months of age in the current study as well as 
ratings reported by Gartstein and Rothbart (2003) and Vonderlin and 
colleagues (2012). Overall, average ratings and standard deviations of the IBQ-
R scales were similar to those reported for 6-9 months old US infants 
(Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003) and for 7-9 months old German infants 
(Vonderlin et al., 2012). Ratings for High Pleasure and Soothability were lower 
in the current sample.  
A principal axis extraction factor analysis with an oblimin rotation was 
conducted for each age in order to evaluate the underlying factor structure of 
the IBQ-R. The two-factor solution derived for the current sample is nearly 
identical to that of Vonderlin and colleagues (2012, see Table 11). At 6 
months, the first factor mainly included the loadings for Activity Level, 
Sadness, Distress to Limitations, Fear, and negative loadings for Falling 
Reactivity and Soothability. This first factor may thus be interpreted as 
Negative Affectivity (Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003). The second factor mainly 
contained the loadings for Approach, Vocal Reactivity, High Pleasure, Low 
Pleasure, Smiling and Laughter, Perceptual Sensitivity, Cuddliness and 
Duration of Orienting. This second factor may thus be interpreted as 
Surgency/Extraversion (Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003). Similarly, at 12 months, 
the Negative Affectivity factor included mainly the loadings for Activity Level, 
Sadness, Distress to Limitations, Fear, and negative loadings for Falling 
Reactivity, but not for Soothability (different from 6 months of age). The 
Surgency/Extraversion factor mainly contained the loadings for Approach, 
Vocal Reactivity, High Pleasure, Low Pleasure, Smiling and Laughter, 
Perceptual Sensitivity, Cuddliness, Duration of Orienting and Soothability. 
Similar to Vonderlin and colleagues (2012), and for ratings at both age points, 
the current analysis did not yield the third factor Self-regulation postulated by 
Gartstein and Rothbart (2003). 
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Table 10: Parental temperament ratings at ages 6 and 12 months 
 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of parental temperament 
ratings at ages 6 and 12 months (n=80) and ratings reported by Vonderlin et al. 
(2012)1 and Gartstein and Rothbart (2003)2. P-values indicate significant 
changes between 6 and 12 months. 
  M (SD) M (SD)1 M (SD)2 
Scale Number of items 6 months 12 months 
7-9 
months 
6-9 
months 
Approachb) 12 5.41** (.81) 5.69 (.67) 5.70 (.60) 5.35 (.81) 
Vocal 
Reactivity b) 12 3.80*** (.91) 4.61 (.91) 4.45 (.98) 4.67 (.80) 
High 
Pleasure 11 5.48*** (.78) 5.75 (.71) 5.86 (.64) 6.03 (.59) 
Smiling & 
Laughter 10 4.17** (.97) 4.47 (.97) 4.34 (1.0) 4.66 (.88) 
Activity 
Level 15 3.86** (.93) 4.10 (.80) 4.09 (.84) 4.37 (.73) 
Perceptual 
Sensitivity a) 12 3.95 (1.17) 4.46 (1.03) 4.40 (1.15) 4.14 (1.05) 
Sadness b) 14 3.46 (.84) 3.52 (.88) 3.48 (.95) 3.45 (.98) 
Distress to 
Limitations 16 3.41*** (.77) 4.24 (.77) 3.90 (.93) 3.56 (.87) 
Fear b) 16 2.16*** (.72) 2.83 (.95) 2.57 (1.05) 2.46 (.97) 
Falling 
Reactivity a) 13 4.94 (.93) 5.13 (.91) 5.05 (1.01) 5.30 (.77) 
Low 
Pleasure 13 5.07*** (.87) 4.53 (.98) 4.96 (.84) 5.07 (.82) 
Cuddliness b) 17 5.62*** (.88) 5.15 (.90) 5.43 (.74) 5.72 (.63) 
Duration of 
Orienting b) 12 3.31 (1.0) 3.20 (1.02) 3.26 (.99) 3.60 (1.13) 
Soothability 18 4.56*** (.94) 3.34 (.52) 5.24 (.69) 5.32 (.75) 
Note. **p < .01. ***p < .001. All p-values two-tailed. a) Scores for Perceptual Sensitivity and 
Falling Reactivity are provided for our sample but not included in further analyses due to 
parental difficulties in responding to the items of these scales. b) Scales are not normally 
distributed why non-parametric comparisons were used. 
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Table 11: IBQ-R factor loadings at ages 6 and 12 months 
 
IBQ-R factor loadings are additionally compared to the loadings obtained by 
Vonderlin et al. (2012)1 and Gartstein and Rothbart (2003)2 
 F1 F2 F3 
Scale 6 m 12 m 1 2 6 m 12 m 1 2 2 
Approach .23    .70 .65 [.39] (.74)  
Vocal 
Reactivity     .63 .59 [.72] (.74)  
High 
Pleasure     .66 .76 [.51] (.69)  
Smiling & 
Laughter .22    .63 .69 [.65] (.55)  
Activity 
Level .46 .39 [.52]   .23 [.31] (.49)  
Perceptual 
Sensitivity .27  [.20]  .63 .51 [.55] (.45)  
Sadness .54 .63 [.79] (.79)      
Distress to 
Limitations .82 .81 [.83] (.69)      
Fear .19 .29 [.36] (.31)      
Falling 
Reactivity -.40 -.30 [-.51] (-.56)  .23    
Low 
Pleasure -.34  [-.39] (-.25) .69 .55 [.54]  (.70) 
Cuddliness   [-.36]  .34 .34   (.56) 
Duration of 
Orienting     .47 .39 [.43]  (.43) 
Soothability -.37  [-.21]   .19 [.29]  (.43) 
Note. F1 = Negative Affectivity, F2= Extraversion/Surgency, F3 = Selfregulation. Loadings < 
.20 are not included (except for Fear at 6 months and Soothability at 12 months for our own 
sample). Loadings obtained by Vonderlin et al. (2012) are listed in square brackets, loadings 
obtained by Gartstein and Rothbart (2003) in round brackets. 
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Pearson product-moment correlations were computed to assess the 
stability of infant temperament ratings (see Table 12). Except for two of the 12 
considered IBQ-R scales (Cuddliness and Soothability), results indicated 
moderate to high normative stability in parental temperament ratings from 6 to 
12 months. To assess developmental change, paired t-tests and Wilcoxon tests 
were computed depending on whether the data were normally distributed. 
Scores significantly increased from 6 to 12 months for Approach, Vocal 
Reactivity, High Pleasure, Smiling and Laughter, Activity Level, Distress to 
Limitations, and Fear; scores significantly decreased for Low Pleasure, 
Cuddliness, and Soothability (all p-values < .01). No significant change was 
observed for Sadness and Duration of Orienting (see Table 10). 
Table 12: Correlations of parental temperament ratings 
 
Pearson product-moment correlations (two-tailed) of parental ratings at ages 
6 and 12 months for 12 IBQ-R scales (n=80). 
Scale r p (two-tailed) 
Approach .496 < .001 
Vocal Reactivity .547 < .001 
High Pleasure .609 < .001 
Smiling & Laughter .620 < .001 
Activity Level .598 < .001 
Sadness .566 < .001 
Distress to Limitations .455 < .001 
Fear .388 < .001 
Low Pleasure .609 < .001 
Cuddliness .210 .061 
Duration of Orienting .607 < .001 
Soothability -.070 .539 
Note. Scores for Perceptual Sensitivity and Falling Reactivity are not provided for our sample 
due to parental difficulties in responding to the items of these scales. 
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3.4 Temperament and Dropout  
Point-biserial correlations were performed to assess whether 
temperament was related to dropout rate. Correlations were performed 
separately for each age point and for temporal position of task (first or second 
task administered). There were no relations between temperament and dropout 
in the first habituation task at 6 months (ps > .07). At 12 months, there was a 
marginally significant correlation showing that non-completers in the first task 
were rated lower in Duration of Orienting than completers (rpb= -.214, p = 
.057). In contrast, significant relations were found between temperament and 
dropout in the second habituation task administered to the infants. At 6 months 
of age, non-completers in the second task were rated higher in Sadness than 
completers (rpb= .228, p = .042). At 12 months of age, non-completers in the 
second task were rated lower in Duration of Orienting than completers (rpb = -
.308, p = .005). 
To test whether dropout was systematically related to individual 
differences in infant temperament, following Vonderlin and colleagues (2008), 
four multivariate analyses of variance were conducted, one for each task and 
age point, with dropout (yes, no), gender (boys, girls) and order of tasks (BoH 
first, Caus first) as factors and mean scores of the 12 IBQ-R scales and the 2 
dimensions (Surgency/Extraversion, Negative Affectivity) as dependent 
variables.   
BoH task at 6 months. Results revealed gender effects for the IBQ-R 
scales Distress to Limitations, F(1,72) = 3.94, p = .051, f  = .23, and High 
Pleasure, F(1,72) = 4.91, p = .030, f = .26. Boys (M = 3.54, SE = .12) were 
rated as being more distressed in confining situations than girls (M = 3.23, SE 
= .14). Also, boys (M = 5.62, SE = .13) were rated as having more pleasure in 
games with high stimulus intensity than girls (M = 5.28, SE = .15). In addition, 
there was a gender X order of tasks interaction for Activity Level, F(1,72) = 
5.20, p = .026, f = .27, and for Negative Affectivity, F(1,72) = 4.47, p = .038, f 
= .25. Boys in the group BoH first (M = 3.63, SE = .18) were rated as less 
active than boys in the group Caus first (M = 4.37, SE = .21), p = .006. Girls in 
the group BoH first (M = 3.38, SE = .12) were rated as having more Negative 
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Affectivity than girls in the group Caus first (M = 3.03, SE = .15), p = .046. 
Finally, there was a dropout X order of tasks interaction for Smiling and 
Laughter, F(1,72) = 5.87, p = .018, f = .28. In the group BoH first, non-
completers (M = 4.40, SE = .18) were rated as showing more Smiling and 
Laughter than completers (M = 3.80, SE = .24), p = .042.  
Caus task at 6 months. Results revealed a gender effect for the IBQ-R 
scale High Pleasure, F(1,72) = 4.18, p = .045, f = .24. Boys (M = 5.62, SE = 
.12) were rated as having more pleasure in games with high stimulus intensity 
than girls (M = 5.28, SE = .15). In addition, for Activity Level, there was a 
gender X order of tasks interaction, F(1,72) = 4.29, p = .042, f = .24, as well as 
a gender X dropout X order of tasks interaction, F(1,72) = 3.92, p = .052, f = 
.23. Boys in the group BoH first (M = 3.63, SE = .18) were rated as less active 
than boys in the group Caus first (M = 4.37, SE = .20), p = .006, and female 
non-completers in the group BoH first (M = 3.42, SE = .28) were rated as less 
active than female completers (M = 4.23, SE = .29), p = .048. Also, there was a 
gender X order of tasks interaction for Negative Affectivity, F(1,72) = 3.69, p 
= .059, f = .23. Girls in the group BoH first (M = 3.38, SE = .12) received 
higher scores in Negative Affectivity than girls in the group Caus first (M = 
3.03, SE = .15), p = .046. Furthermore, there was a gender X dropout 
interaction for Fear, F(1,72) = 3.13, p = .081, f = .21, and for Soothability, 
F(1,72) = 3.70, p = .058, f = .23. Male non-completers (M = 2.36, SE = .17) 
were rated as more fearful than male completers (M = 1.94, SE = .13), p = .058, 
and female non-completers (M = 4.12, SE = .28) were rated as being harder to 
soothe than female completers (M = 4.69, SE = .21), p = .077. 
 BoH task at 12 months. Dropout effects were found for Sadness, 
F(1,72) = 5.86, p = .018, f = .28, Negative Affectivity, F(1,72) = 3.05, p = 
.085, f = .21, and Duration of Orienting, F(1,72) = 2.93, p = .091, f = .20. 
Completers (M = 3.60, SE = .10) were rated as being more sad than non-
completers (M = 3.21, SE = .28), and completers (M = 3.70, SE = .07) received 
higher scores in Negative Affectivity than non-completers (M = 3.36, SE = 
.18). Additionally, completers (M = 3.35, SE = .13) received higher scores in 
Duration of Orienting than non-completers (M = 2.63, SE = .33). There was a 
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main effect of order of tasks for Approach, F(1,72) = 3.11, p = .082, f = .20, 
and a dropout X order of tasks interaction for Approach, F(1,72) = 6.98, p = 
.010, f = .31, High Pleasure, F(1,72) = 3.30, p = .073, f = .21, and Negative 
Affectivity, F(1,72) = 2.94, p = .091, f = .20. In the group Caus first, non-
completers (M = 6.02, SE = .18) were rated as showing more approach than 
completers (M = 5.66, SE = .12), p = .031, and non-completers (M = 6.02, SE = 
.20) were rated as having more pleasure in games with high stimulus intensity 
than completers (M = 5.65, SE = .13), p = .039. In the group BoH first, 
completers (M = 3.83, SE = .10) received higher scores in Negative Affectivity 
than non-completers (M = 3.07, SE = .34). This last result might be due to 
chance because the non-completer group consisted of only three infants and 
will thus not be discussed further. 
Caus task at 12 months. There was a gender effect for Cuddliness, 
F(1,72) = 3.0, p = .090, f = .20. Girls (M = 5.34, SE = .26) were rated as being 
more cuddly than boys (M = 5.01, SE = .16). In addition, there was a gender X 
dropout interaction for Duration of Orienting, F(1,72) = 2.79, p = .099, f = .20. 
Male completers (M = 3.49, SE = .17) received higher scores in Duration of 
Orienting than male non-completers (M = 2.60, SE = .31), p = .003.  
As order of tasks depends on study design and gender is not random, 
interaction effects including gender and order of task are not discussed further 
in the following section. 
4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to longitudinally examine the impact 
of infant temperament on the dropout rate in visual habituation experiments in 
infants at 6 and 12 months of age. For both habituation tasks and both age 
groups, there were no differences between groups of completers and non-
completers for the majority of the 12 considered IBQ-R subscale ratings. Only 
few subscales were found to have an influence on dropout in the current 
sample (22 out of 384 possible effects were significant at p < .10). Our specific 
hypotheses were only confirmed for Duration of Orienting in that a higher 
score in this subscale related to completion of the task. Overall, the present 
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data are in line with the findings of the newer studies (Slaughter & Suddendorf, 
2007; Vonderlin et al., 2008) suggesting that only few temperamental factors 
influence the completion of visual habituation experiments in infancy. In 
addition, this is, to our knowledge, the second study that evaluated the factor 
structure of the IBQ-R in a German sample. Consistent with Vonderlin and 
colleagues (2012), a two-factor solution was found in the current sample with 
Surgency/Extraversion and Negative Affectivity as underlying temperament 
dimension both at 6 and 12 months of age. Together with previous findings 
showing a three-factor solution in other countries (e.g., Casalin et al., 2012, 
Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003), these results point to potential cultural differences 
in the structure of infant temperament.  
Dropout rates: infant age and task type. Compared to other studies 
using visual habituation or violation-of-expectation techniques (Slaughter & 
Suddendorf, 2007), the dropout rate in the current sample was in part quite 
high: 68% in the BoH task and 42% in the Caus task at 6 months, and 21% in 
both tasks at 12 months. These dropout rates are similar to those reported by 
Hohenberger and colleagues (2012) who used the same two habituation tasks 
also within a larger battery of tasks at 6 and 10 months of age. Possibly, 
methodological differences in paradigms employed (e.g., habituation, 
familiarization, violation-of-expectation, paired-comparison techniques) might 
explain differences in dropout rate in infant looking time studies. In the current 
work, length of trial and length of habituation phase were infant-controlled, 
thus length of test sessions varied with infant interest. However, we spared 
fancy attention getters at the beginning of each trial, which might account in 
part for higher dropout rates. Number of trials and looking time criteria were 
held constant across the two habituation tasks but dropout rate differed 
between tasks at 6 months. This difference together with similar dropout rates 
in Hohenberger and colleagues (2012) suggest that the high dropout rate 
especially in the BoH task at 6 months might be due to other factors like infant 
age and type of stimuli rather than the specific procedure used. Dropout was 
less frequent at the age of 12 months compared to 6 months. One reason why 
infants at 6 months are more likely to dropout in the habituation tasks might be 
that their self-regulation is still developing compared to 12 months of age 
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(Zentner & Bates, 2008). At the younger age, infants might have more 
difficulties to stay calm and to cope with the task demands of the habituation 
tasks, bringing contextual factors into question. In fact, although the two visual 
habituation tasks shared the same procedure and setup, results suggest that the 
BoH task was more difficult to complete than the Caus task at 6 months, but 
not at 12 months. This apparent difference in task difficulty at 6 months may 
have been related to surface properties of the video stimuli and/or to the 
understanding infants had of the content of the events presented. In the Caus 
task, stimuli consisted of a 2D scene with brightly colored simple shapes with 
clear contours that were presented against a white background. Some of the 
shapes (spheres) rolled across the screen. In contrast, the BoH stimuli consisted 
in a 3D scene, in which a human hand (and white-sleeved arm) moved towards 
one of two brightly colored toys (a duck and a tower) on a stage and pushed 
this toy to the back of the stage. The stage and the background were dark in 
color. In terms of surface features, the Caus stimuli were less complex and 
more colorful than the BoH stimuli. It might therefore be that at 6 months, 
infants were overall more attracted to the Caus stimuli compared to the BoH 
stimuli. As to conceptual content, previous research showed that infants 
perceive the Back-of-Hand action as directed towards a goal by 6 months (e.g., 
Jovanovic et al., 2007), whereas infants understand the violation of the physical 
principle in the Caus task only by 10 months of age (Hohenberger et al., 2012). 
It is therefore unlikely that dropout rates at 6 months were related to a 
differential understanding of the conceptual content of the stimulus events, 
given that in this case, the BoH task should have been less difficult than the 
Caus task. Please note that in both tasks, duration of trials were infant-
controlled. 
Underlying temperament dimensions. The average scores of the IBQ-R 
scales were overall comparable to those reported by Gartstein and Rothbart 
(2003) and Vonderlin and colleagues (2012). However, findings regarding 
underlying dimensions as revealed by the factor structure are only in part 
consistent with previous work. Whereas a three-factor solution was found for 
US American (Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003), Polish (Dragan, Kmita, & 
Fronczyk, 2011), Russian (Gartstein, Knyazev, & Slobodskaya, 2005) and 
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Italian (Montirosso, Cozzi, Putnam, Gartstein, & Borgatti, 2011) infants, the 
current work confirmed the two-factor solution found by Vonderlin and 
colleagues (2012) with Surgency/Extraversion and Negative Affectivity as the 
only two underlying dimensions (please see Nakagawa & Sukigara (2005) for a 
comparable two-factor solution in a Japanese sample). Vonderlin and 
colleagues (2012) suggested that development of self-regulation with respect to 
age ranges assessed in the different studies might explain the differences in 
factor structure between their German sample and the above-cited work. 
Whereas the studies finding a three-factor solution based their analyses on data 
comprising the first 12 months of age, the age ranges assessed in the two 
German samples were rather narrow. Since self-regulatory components begin 
to develop later in the second half of the first year of life, it might be possible 
that they cannot be assessed separately from affectivity at a younger age 
(Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart, 2001). Thus, a two-factor solution would be 
predicted in younger infants and a three-factor solution in older infants, or in 
samples comprising also a substantial group of older infants. However, the 
findings of the current study are inconsistent with this prediction, as analyses 
yielded nearly the same two-factor solution both when infants were 6 as well as 
12 months of age. Still, the scales contained in the IBQ-R were designed to 
cover a wide age range (3-12 months), which might also account for 
differences in factor structure between the two German samples and the above-
cited work. This explanation is supported by a change between age points in 
the frequency of mother's non-applicability ratings that also differs between 
single scales. For example, number of caregivers rating more than 50% of the 
items as non-applicable changed for Perceptual Sensitivity from 10 caregivers 
at 6 months to 2 caregivers at 12 months, whereas there was no change in 
frequency for Falling Reactivity (2 caregivers at each age point). It is therefore 
still an open question for future work to address, whether a three-factor 
solution would result from ratings of a German sample that includes infants 
ranging from 3 to 12 months of age. 
A second explanation put forward by Vonderlin and colleagues (2012) 
regards the considerable correlations found (Putnam et al., 2001) between 
Orienting/Regulation and the two other dimensions, Surgency/Extraversion and 
STUDY 3    105 
 
 
Negative Affectivity, that question the assumption of Orienting/Regulation as a 
third independent dimension (please see also Evans & Rothbart, 2009, for 
arguments in favor of a higher-order two-factor model). Finally, cultural 
differences may explain the differences found in factor structure. It might be 
that the everyday situations described in the IBQ-R differ in their occurrence 
between countries. For example, parents in the present sample seemed to have 
difficulties in responding to the two subscales Perceptual Sensitivity and 
Falling Reactivity. It might be that these subscales contain items or situations 
that are more common in daily life for US Americans than for Germans. It may 
also be that the German translation did not perfectly correspond to the specific 
situation referred to in some of the items. Thus differences in factor structure 
may reflect also differences in parents’ understanding of the items. Related to 
this, parents’ interpretation of infant behavior as indicating a specific 
temperament characteristic might also differ between cultures. Nakagawa and 
Sukigara (2005) showed that Japanese mothers did not correctly assign the 
single IBQ-R items to the 14 subscales, failing especially for the subscales 
Activity Level and Distress to Limitations. It is therefore favorable that the 
given items in a temperamental questionnaire validly indicate the underlying 
temperament characteristics across different cultures (Gartstein et al., 2006). 
Finally, cultural differences in parenting might account for differences in factor 
structure. First, despite a genetic component of temperament, child rearing 
fosters temperament characteristics that are in line with the respective cultural 
values (Kohnstamm, 1989; Gartstein et al., 2006). Second, parents potentially 
rate their infants’ temperament characteristics by referring to culture-specific 
standards on, e.g., desirability and normativity (Slobodskaya, Gartstein, 
Nakagawa, & Putnam, 2012). In line with this argument, Vonderlin and 
colleagues (2012) suggested a revision or even an extinction of some item 
translations due to low discrimination coefficients.  
A limitation of the present study is that temperament was only assessed 
via parental report. Research suggests that parental report might be biased by 
parental depression and anxiety as well as by parental expectations formed 
during pregnancy (Leerkes & Crockenberg, 2003; Wolk, Zeanah, Garcia-Coll 
& Carr, 1992). Also, while some studies assessing the agreement between 
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parental report on temperament and observational data collected in laboratory 
assessments (Parade & Lerkes, 2008) or home observations (Stifter, 
Willoughby, Towe-Goodman & The Family Life Project Key Investigators, 
2008) yielded support for the validity of the IBQ-R, other studies found little 
concordance between parental report and observational measures (e.g., Seifer, 
Sameroff, Barrett & Krafchuk, 1994). However, moderate agreement is 
expected when raters differ in interactional contexts and size of reference 
population (e.g., Funder & West, 1993). Parents have the opportunity to 
observe their children in a variety of different situations for a long period of 
time, whereas an observation at home or in the lab only allows a rather brief 
glimpse on behavior indicating temperament (Stifter et al., 2008). Despite the 
limitations of parental report measures, it is important for the current work that 
a study by Pauli-Pott, Mertesacker and Beckmann (2005) reported a satisfying 
convergence between parental ratings in the German version of the IBQ and 
observational data. 
Dropout rates: longitudinal analyses. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to longitudinally assess long-term stability in dropout rates by employing 
the same two tasks across age points. In the current study, there was no 
evidence for longitudinal stability in dropout rates between the 6 and 12 
months visit. These findings are inconsistent with Bell and Slater (2002) who 
reported a long-term stability of dropout rate in two different tasks. Infants who 
did not complete a habituation task at 4 months were also those who did not 
complete a problem-solving task at 13 months. The authors assumed “that there 
might be something relatively stable in the infant […] across certain 
environments, and across time, underlying these findings” (p. 157). However, 
instead of some stable infant characteristic, stability in task demands may also 
explain this stability in dropout. Although the two tasks employed by Bell and 
Slater (2002) differed in content, it may be that they posed comparable 
demands on infants across testing sessions exactly because the type of task was 
adjusted to infants’ interests at the respective point in development. In the 
current study, differences in dropout rates suggest that the same tasks may have 
indeed posed different demands on infants at the different age points. Still, the 
relatively high normative stability in parental temperament ratings supports the 
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interpretation that dropout in the current study was due to age-related 
differences in perceived task characteristics or other contextual factors rather 
than infant temperament. 
Temperament: longitudinal analyses. Parental ratings of infant 
temperament showed both stability and changes across the second half of the 
first year. Correlation coefficients for 11 out of the 12 temperament subscales 
considered ranged between .21 and .62, indicating moderate to high normative 
stability in infant temperament between 6 and 12 months of age. Soothability 
was the only subscale where no stability in parental ratings was found. At the 
end of the first year, the emergence of stranger anxiety and the consolidation of 
attachment relationships may account for this lack in stability. By this time, 
differences in attachment style also account for differences in soothability. In 
fact, soothability constitutes a crucial criterium for attachment classification 
and varies between caretakers as a function of attachment relationship (e.g., 
van den Boom, 2004). Furthermore, developmental change in infant self-
regulation may also explain the lack of stability in Soothability. One may 
speculate that with better self-regulatory abilities, infants in the current sample 
mostly needed their parents in very disturbing situations when they were 
unable to self-regulate and consequently appeared harder to soothe. This 
explanation would be consistent with the finding that as a group parents rated 
infants as less soothable at 12 compared to 6 months of age. 
In addition to the reported moderate to high normative stability, there 
were significant changes in average ratings for 10 out of the 12 (14) subscales 
suggesting that the temperament domains considered here are subject to 
developmental change between 6 and 12 months of age. There was a 
significant increase in the ratings for Approach, Vocal Reactivity, High 
Pleasure, Smiling and Laughter, Activity Level, Distress to Limitations, and 
Fear, whereas the ratings for Low Pleasure, Cuddliness, and Soothability 
showed a significant decrease. No change was observed in the ratings for 
Sadness and Duration of Orienting. Carranza Carnicero and colleagues (2000) 
reported similar developmental changes in the first year of life in a study 
employing the five subscales of the original IBQ (Rothbart, 1981). Between 3 
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and 12 months, they observed an increase in Activity Level, Distress to 
Limitations, Fear and Smiling and Laughter and no changes in Duration of 
Orienting. 
Influence of temperament on dropout rate. Results of the multivariate 
analyses suggest that dropout rate seemed not to be systematically influenced 
by differences in infants’ temperament. Analyses yielded only few significant 
main and interactions effects that were rather unsystematically scattered across 
the IBQ-R scales. Furthermore, these relations were not consistent across age 
points and tasks. Most support was found for an influence of Duration of 
Orienting on dropout rate. At 12 months of age, completers in the BoH task as 
well as male completers in the Caus task received higher scores for Duration of 
Orienting. These results are consistent with Fagen et al.’s (1987) work showing 
that at 9 months, females who did not complete an operant conditioning task 
due to crying scored lower on Duration of Orienting than non-criers. These 
findings suggest that Duration of Orienting may be a crucial temperament 
dimension, influencing dropout in visual habituation tasks, especially at the end 
of the first year of life. The other main effect of dropout regarded Sadness. At 
12 months of age, infants that completed the BoH task were rated as lower in 
mood than non-completers. A tentative explanation might be that parents 
evaluated not only crying and unresponsivity as sadness, but also passiveness 
and quietness and therefore slightly overestimated the sadness score of the 
completers. 
In addition to differential effects of task demands across age and 
tasks, the time of administration of the specific task within the testing session 
seems to be a further contextual factor influencing likelihood of dropout. In the 
present work, dropout was related to both 1) temporal position of the task 
within the test session (about 10 or 45 min after the beginning) and 2) order of 
tasks, that is, to temporal position in combination with type of task (BoH first, 
Caus first). Importantly, only in the second habituation task administered to 
infants, significant relations between infant temperament and dropout were 
found. At 6 months of age, dropout in the second habituation task was related 
to higher rating scores in Sadness. Infants with a generally lower mood related 
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to personal suffering and/or inability to perform a desired action seemed to 
have more difficulties to complete the second habituation task. Infants with 
these temperament characteristics might have experienced the second task as 
more demanding not only because of fatigue but also because the other tasks 
might have been more interesting to the infant (e.g., playing with mom, 
presence of toys) such that they would have liked to return to these activities. 
At 12 months of age, dropout in the second habituation task administered to 
infants was related to lower rating scores in Duration of Orienting. Infants who 
were rated as more able to attend to a single object for an extended period of 
time seemed to have fewer difficulties to complete a habituation task when the 
task was administered after a series of other potentially fatiguing tasks. As to 
order of tasks, individual differences in Approach and High Pleasure were 
related to dropout at 12 months of age in the BoH task, but only if the BoH task 
was presented second. Non-completers were rated as showing more rapid 
approach and positive anticipation of pleasurable activities as well as having 
more pleasure in games with high stimulus intensity than completers. Possibly, 
in the group of non-completers there were mostly infants with a higher arousal 
level who get easily excited and who were therefore more rapidly frustrated 
when confronted with a boring task. Interestingly, the dimension of High 
Pleasure is related to the construct of sensation seeking (Putnam et al., 2001; 
Zuckerman, 1990). It is possible that these non-completers might have been 
bored by the task, given that they had been already administered one of a 
similar kind. Also, a crucial characteristic of habituation tasks is to repeatedly 
present infants with the same stimulus until they loose interest.  
Infant gender. Prior research suggests that a potential impact of infant 
temperament on dropout may vary as a function of gender (Fagen et al., 1987; 
Wachs & Smitherman, 1985). Infant gender was therefore included as control 
variable in each multivariate analysis of variance. Gender main effects were 
revealed for three subscales. At the age of 6 months, boys were rated as having 
more pleasure in games with high stimulus intensity than girls. This effect was 
also observed by Gartstein and Rothbart (2003) and reported in a meta-analysis 
by Else-Quest and colleagues (Else-Quest, Shibley Hyde, Hill Goldsmith & 
Van Hulle, 2006). Additionally, 6 months old boys were rated as being more 
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fussy and distressed in a confining situation. This result is consistent with 
Gunnar and colleagues (Gunnar, Porter, Wolf, Rigatuso & Larson, 1995) who 
also reported higher parental ratings of distress to limitations for boys 
compared to girls at 6 months. There is evidence that already as neonates, girls 
show a greater degree of cuddliness than boys (Benenson, Philippoussis & 
Leeb, 1999). In the current study, this difference was only found at 12 months 
but not at 6 months of age. As to interaction effects of infant gender and 
dropout, Fear and Soothability show relations to dropout rate dependent on 
gender in the Caus task at 6 months of age. On the one hand, male non-
completers were rated as more fearful and more easily startled by novel 
situations than male completers. Since the whole testing procedure was a 
novel, unfamiliar situation these boys might have been too aroused to complete 
the habituation task. On the other hand, female completers were rated as more 
easily soothed by a parent than female non-completers. Since infants were 
sitting on their parent’s lap during the habituation task, it might be that easily 
soothed females benefitted from this closeness. Alternatively, this result might 
be explained by the fact that these girls were also better in self-regulation and 
were therefore more likely to complete the habituation task. Finally, male non-
completers were rated lower in Duration of Orienting at 12 months in the Caus 
task compared to male completers. Though direction of effects are consistent 
with the idea that infants with a difficult temperament are more likely to be a 
dropout, these few interaction effects do not suggest a systematic relationship 
between gender, temperament and likelihood of dropout. It also remains an 
open question why these gender differences were specific to dropout in the 
Caus task.  
In sum, the present study supports the assumption that dropout in infant 
visual habituation studies is not systematically related to a different 
temperament between infants who complete the task under investigation and 
infants who show heightened distress such that testing ends before completion 
of the task. This suggests that the relatively high dropout rates reported in 
infant looking time studies are not systematically related to infant 
temperament. However, findings also suggest that temperament might have an 
impact on likelihood of dropout in the presence of specific contextual factors 
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such as task characteristics (e.g., attractiveness of stimuli) and time of task 
administration within a test session. Differences in temperament seem to have 
an impact on infants’ performance especially in more demanding and stressful 
situations, for example, when a habituation task is conducted at the end of a 
longer test session. It is therefore recommendable to conduct visual habituation 
tasks rather at the beginning than at the end of a test session, and to only 
conduct one task per test session.  
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Chapter 3: General Discussion 
 
From early infancy, children are attentive interaction partners that gain 
increasing insight into other people’s minds with advancing age. It is well 
investigated that around the age of 4 years children develop a so called Theory 
of Mind that enables them to understand the causal relation between people’s 
mental states and actions and consequently to correctly predict their actions 
(Wellman et al., 2001). Around two decades ago, earlier social-cognitive 
development has gained attention. Research has shown that already infants and 
toddlers pay regard to the subjectivity and directedness of mental states while 
interpreting human behavior (e.g. Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, 1998, 1999). 
Theorists have argued that some of these abilities are indicators of children’s 
understanding of intentionality (Tomasello, 1999; Woodward, 1998). As to 
early understanding of goal-directed action, children develop an understanding 
of the relation between an actor’s intention and the manipulated object. Joint 
attention skills implicate the understanding that a person’s actions are pursuing 
a certain goal. Beyond, Perner (1991) has associated further early social-
cognitive abilities to later ToM. He argued that pretend play and mirror self-
recognition both rely on a capacity for secondary representation. Therefore, 
they might also provide the foundation for the later meta-representation and the 
ability to attribute mental states to self and others. If these abilities are related 
in fact, we would indeed expect longitudinal relations from the single early 
abilities to later ToM as well as interrelations between these early social-
cognitive abilities. 
Subsequently, researchers tried to reveal a relation between some of the 
early social-cognitive abilities and later ToM and found a relation for early 
action-understanding (Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2004, 2008; 
Yamaguchi et al., 2009), joint attention (Charman et al., 2000; Sodian & 
Kristen-Antonow, 2015), intention-based imitation (Colonnesi et al., 2008; 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005), and pretend play (Youngblade & Dunn, 
1995). These results support the assumption of continuity in social-cognitive 
development (e.g. Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2008) but only 
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few studies have investigated the interrelations between these early social-
cognitive abilities so far. Investigating how the single abilities were also 
longitudinally interrelated is important to further clarify the supposed 
continuity, as interrelations would suggest that these abilities are part of the 
same ability. It could provide some evidence for Perner’s (1991) assumption 
that the social-cognitive abilities rely on the maturation of secondary 
representation (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). Yet, it is still an open question 
if these mentioned social-cognitive abilities are early manifestations of a 
developing ToM or if these abilities are first required to enable one to develop 
a ToM (Henning, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). 
Partial support for the continuity hypothesis concerning the early social-
cognitive abilities and the assumption that the social-cognitive abilities 
establish consecutively is provided by the following findings: The 
understanding of other’s intentions in intention-based imitation tasks was 
found to be related to earlier infant’s understanding of intentional actions 
(Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009), to infant’s declarative pointing (Camaioni et 
al. 2004; Colonnesi et al., 2008; Kristen et al., 2011) and to infant’s performing 
in goal detection tasks (Charman et al., 2000). Additionally, children’s mirror 
self-recognition related to infant’s declarative pointing (Sodian & Kristen-
Antonow, 2015) as well as to pretend play (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). 
Nevertheless, a general relation between the single abilities could not be found 
(e.g. Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). That is why additional studies providing 
further evidence for continuity in social-cognitive development are needed. To 
my knowledge, study 1 was the first longitudinal study that assessed cross-
sectional and longitudinal relations between five early social-cognitive abilities 
in the same group of children. Based on the number of investigated abilities, 
our results revealed only few interrelations but these were in consistence with 
previous findings. Mainly, a relation between intention-based imitation and 
two joint attention abilities, namely declarative pointing and detection of 
experimenter’s goal while teasing, were found as well as a relation between 
pretend play and mirror self-recognition. Partially, in some aspects, our results 
support previous research (Camaioni et al., 2004; Charman et al., 2000; Kristen 
et al., 2011; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004) and they complement findings in support 
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of continuity in social-cognitive development. Moreover, our results make 
clear that this continuity in social-cognitive development is not global but 
rather task- and age-specific. It is still an open question whether social 
cognition develops within one domain or whether there exist different domains 
of social cognition. It might also be, as Charman and colleagues (Charman et 
al., 2000) postulated, that these abilities are possibly part of an underlying 
“social cognitive representational ability to understand and interact with people 
[…] and objects” (p. 492) that emerges within a specific timeframe, after which 
abilities develop along diverging pathways. Therefore, as I mentioned before, 
future studies should necessarily assess the respective abilities not only with a 
single task at one age but with a variety of complementing tasks at different 
ages in continuous, shorter intervals to clarify the supposed continuity. Another 
example that otherwise relations could not be discovered by only assessing 
single abilities might be the study by Nielsen and Dissanayake (2004). They 
longitudinally examined imitation, pretend play and mirror self-recognition at 
three-monthly intervals between the ages of 12 and 24 months, but only 
conducted one task per ability. For example, they tested pretend play in a 
single scripted drinking task with dichotomous scoring instead of a free play 
episode. In contrast to other studies using the latter (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004; 
study 1), relations between pretend play and mirror self-recognition could not 
been found using this procedure (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). This might 
indicate that detecting (age- and task-) specific cross-sectional and longitudinal 
associations between the early social-cognitive abilities requires a more 
continuous assessment rather than conducting unique tasks. Another 
explanation, at least for the few significant relations between the abilities 
emerging at 18 months of age, might be that these abilities are not expressed 
simultaneously (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). As intention-based imitation, 
mirror self-recognition and pretend play all demand to represent two different 
representations of the same object or situation (Perner, 1991), they are all 
supposed to rely on secondary representation. Yet, children might have to 
separately learn how to apply their knowledge in the different abilities. The 
same could be assumed for the different joint attention abilities emerging 
around the end of the first year of life. Mundy and colleagues (Mundy et al., 
2007) reported, for example, different development patterns for initiating and 
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responding to joint attention and behavior request. Consequently they 
questioned a common underlying concept of social cognition. This view would 
speak against a domain-general change in social-cognitive development in 
infancy (see Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). It seems more likely to assume 
that children’s ToM abilities subsequently develop from infancy on. Further 
long-term longitudinal studies are necessary to adequately investigate the 
continuity hypothesis and the social-cognitive development before the 
emergence of ToM in preschool age with a fully developed false belief 
understanding. 
Also study 2 aimed to extend previous findings, focusing on the 
influence of temperament on social-cognitive development. Wellman and 
colleagues (Lane et al., 2013; Wellman et al., 2011) have originally advanced 
this idea by suggesting a developmental link between childhood temperament 
and ToM abilities that is specific to a less reactive, more observant 
temperament. To explain how child temperament might influence ToM 
development they refer to the emotional reactivity hypothesis (Hare, 2007) that 
originally accounts for social-cognitive capacities in dogs vs. wild canines and 
chimpanzees. It holds that, as a result of selecting dogs for domestication based 
on their nonaggressive and non-fearful temperament towards humans, 
development of human-like social-communicative skills in these animals was 
supported. In convergent evolution with humans, level of emotional reactivity 
has modulated domesticated dogs’ social-cognitive performance. Wellman and 
colleagues (Wellman et al., 2011) assumed that this hypothesis is transferable 
on human development. Hence, an initial difference in child temperament may 
lead to differences in interactive behavior and social experiences, which in turn 
may foster or interfere with the development of mental understanding. Yet, 
supporting evidence is provided by two studies showing a relation between 
shy, nonaggressive and perceptually sensitive behavior and false belief 
understanding in preschoolers (Wellman et al., 2011), even across different 
cultures (Lane et al., 2013). Study 2 aimed to investigate this relation in 
toddlers. In fact, children with shy temperament at 18 months as well as at 3 
years of age showed better ToM abilities at 3 years of age. Without actively 
participating, shy children may still gain insights in the processes of social 
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interactions. Thus, our results support the assumption that shyness fosters the 
ability to reason about others’ mental states, actually already before the 
emergence of false belief understanding. Our findings contribute to the 
understanding of ToM development in early childhood. From infancy on, one 
might predict the ToM development of children based on their temperament. 
Still, little is known about the relation between ToM and temperament. It 
would be interesting to know if certain temperament factors reflecting social-
emotional reactivity also influences early social-cognitive abilities already in 
infancy. Future research should investigate the relations between temperament 
and the early social-cognitive abilities we have assessed in study 1.  
In addition to examining the influence of temperament on children’s 
early ToM abilities, we analyzed the influence of language, siblings, and 
parental education in study 2. Contrary to temperament, the influence of these 
three variables on ToM is well investigated. Yet, findings are controversial. 
Children’s language skills are often discussed in the literature as an important 
predictor of ToM development. Whereas most previous research pointed to a 
beneficial effect of language on ToM (e.g., Milligan et al., 2007), our results 
showed no evidence that language abilities at the ages of 18 months or 3 years 
influence ToM development although we assessed different language skills. 
However, our finding is in line with other studies analyzing language when 
studying ToM (e.g., Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2004, 2008) 
who also did not find such a relation. There exist various reasonable 
hypotheses about how language affects ToM development. Although almost 
every aspect of language seems to have an essential influence on ToM 
development, it might be that certain language abilities are particularly more 
important for different aspects of ToM (see Cutting & Dunn, 1999). On the one 
hand, perhaps, potential relations between language and ToM abilities could 
have been detected using another instrument for testing children’s language 
skills. On the other hand, potential relations between language and ToM 
abilities might be detected when in fact investigating false belief 
understanding. In contrast to the 4-year-olds tested within the broader project, 
we only conducted those ToM tasks that demand less language skills than more 
complex false-belief tasks with the 3-year-olds. Maybe a relation between 
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language and ToM is therefore not to be found in study 2. Nevertheless, further 
(longitudinal) investigation is needed to clarify the general assumption that 
ToM is influenced by language, as evidence concerning this relation is 
somewhat inconsistent.  
In addition, our results are inconsistent with previous findings reporting 
a positive impact of siblings on ToM abilities (e.g., Cassidy et al., 2005; 
McAlister & Peterson, 2006, 2007, 2013). Although interactions with siblings 
seem to be relevant for ToM development, in that siblings share closer interests 
and feelings with the child as parents do (Dunn et al., 1991), neither number of 
siblings nor presence of one or more older siblings had a positive effect on 
ToM in study 2. However, our finding is in line with other studies that did not 
find a sibling effect when studying ToM (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Henning 
et al., 2011). As mentioned earlier, it might be that children have to reach a 
certain age before siblings can have a positive influence regarding the 
understanding of mental states. Ruffman and colleagues (Ruffman et al., 1998) 
specified the age of 39 months as critical to benefit from siblings in this area. 
This assumption might be verified in a further analysis including the data of the 
4-years-old’s ToM abilities that were assessed in the broader project, too. 
Alternatively, following the assumption by Cutting and Dunn (1999) it is also 
likely to assume that not the number or age of siblings per se, but the quality of 
interaction and relationships with siblings is relevant for children’s ToM 
development (Cutting & Dunn, 1999).  
Finally, results for parental education in study 2 are inconsistent with 
previous findings, in that an impact on ToM abilities was reported (e.g., 
Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Neither maternal nor paternal education had a positive 
impact on ToM. However, despite the expectation that children of families 
with low socio-economic status lag behind children of families with middle 
socio-economic status in ToM development (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999) other 
studies analyzing parental socio-economic status when studying ToM (e.g., 
Lucariello, Durand, & Yarnell, 2007) did not find such a relation. We report on 
this finding, as parental education is one of the markers for socio-economic 
status of families (Bornstein, Hahn, Suwalsky, & Haynes, 2003). One reason 
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might be that the reported gap between children with different socio-economic 
status is restricted to certain ToM tasks, especially false-belief tasks (Lucariello 
et al., 2007). In study 2, we neither investigated false belief reasoning in the 3-
year-olds. Furthermore, it seems important which measure is selected to 
indicate SES (see Bornstein et al., 2003). Beyond, our result that parental 
education had no impact on ToM might be result of the parents in our sample 
being predominantly highly educated, except for some early school dropouts. 
One can speculate that well-educated parents are more willing to participate 
with their children in psychological studies taking place at Saarland University 
that is also situated out-of-town and therefore variance might be restricted in 
questions regarding parental factors. Besides this phenomenon, one can 
question what mechanisms are initiated by high parental education or socio-
economic status that in turn might affect children’s ToM development (Cutting 
& Dunn, 1999). It might be the way in which parents talk or interact with their 
children or the activities they take part in. Possibly, social interactions and 
activities in Saarland families might not crucially differ depending on high or 
lower educational level so that differences in ToM development were not 
detectable in the tested children. Even if a lot of parents in our sample were 
academics, they predominantly come from homes with working class 
background in mining and metallurgy. Thus, our sample might be a more 
homogenous group of people independent of different education. As for the 
impact of siblings on ToM, the influence of parental education might not be 
that crucial at the beginning of the third year of age and only begins to matter 
during preschool age. Still, these findings are also consistent with previous 
research that lack to find a relation between maternal education and ToM (e.g., 
Farhadian et al., 2011; Ruffman et al., 1999). In sum, even if language, 
siblings, and parental education all are well-investigated factors, their influence 
on ToM development is not finally resolved, yet. There exist still some 
outstanding aspects that need to be considered and detect in future research. 
Study 3 investigated the influence of temperament on task performance 
and focused on its impact on dropout in visual habituation tasks. As we 
recognized in the course of the study that especially the habituation tasks had 
to be aborted ahead of time, we further investigated this phenomenon of 
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dropout. Habituation tasks per se pose special requirements to children: not 
only have they to deal with an unfamiliar environment and interact with 
strangers, but also the habituation task as such demands them to remain calm 
and focused on the presented stimuli. According to Slaughter and Suddendorf 
(2007) dropout rates up to more than 60% are common in habituation tasks. In 
their review, temperament has been discussed as one possible influencing 
factor. If children are excluded for fussiness that might be caused by certain 
temperamental traits hindering these children to regulate during habituation 
task, this dropout could systematically bias research findings. At last, Slaughter 
and Suddendorf (2007) could not find an influence of temperament on dropout 
whereas older studies did so (e.g., Miceli et al., 1998). In our project, the visual 
habituation tasks had to be aborted by the experimenter plenty of times, usually 
due to infants’ fussy behavior. As the reported findings are controversial, we 
examined post-hoc if the high dropout rate might be caused by children’s 
temperament. One of our main concerns, as we followed the same children 
over a variety of tasks in this longitudinal project, affected the question if the 
results of the remaining children completing the tasks were generalizable or if 
the dropouts systematically influenced them. Moreover, our study design and 
the fact that we employed two visual habituation tasks that only differed in 
content enabled us to longitudinally investigate the dependence of dropout on 
task content. Our results showed that temperament has only little impact on 
dropout; a finding that is in line with the more recent studies on this topic (e.g., 
Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007). Only the ability to attend to something for an 
extended time seems to be related to completion of a habituation task. This is 
an important finding ensuring that study results are not specific for children 
with a special temperament but are generalizable on the population. 
Nevertheless, the results comparing both types of habituation tasks suggest that 
specific task characteristics, as for example attractiveness of stimuli, and time 
of task administration might be important to regard. Hence, depending on 
requirement and time of conduction, temperament might indeed play a role on 
dropout in infant studies. Consequently, visual habituation tasks should be 
conducted rather at the beginning of a test session to minimize a potential 
impact of temperament. Anyway, a negative influence of temperament on task 
performance might be negligible.  
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In addition, assessing temperament longitudinally with the same 
questionnaire enabled us to investigate the stability of temperament in infancy. 
Parental ratings of infant temperament showed both stability and change across 
the second half of the first year. Our findings indicate moderate to high 
normative stability in infant temperament between 6 and 12 months of age. 
Anyhow, in consistence with previous findings (Carranza Carnicero et al., 
2000), most of the considered temperament domains are also found to be 
subject to developmental change between 6 and 12 months of age. Finally, 
study 3 provides converging evidence for the assumption that parental report is 
a valid but economic mean for assessing children’s temperament especially in 
large samples (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Although some research suggests that 
parental report on temperament might be biased (Leerkes & Crockenberg, 
2003; Wolk et al., 1992), other studies assessing the agreement between 
parental report and observational data (Parade & Lerkes, 2008; Stifter et al., 
2008) yielded support for the validity of the IBQ-R and IBQ, also in German 
translation (Pauli-Pott et al., 2005). 
In summary, in this dissertation, a large number of children were 
investigated with comprehensive assessments of social cognition during the 
first three years of life. Still not all of the questions raised at the beginning of 
this work could be answered. In all three studies, hypotheses were proven true 
only in part. Further developmental research is needed to clarify the 
development of early social cognition and possible influencing factors. Still, 
continuity in social-cognitive development contains much more topics to 
address as for example the debate whether early social-cognitive abilities are 
early manifestations of a developing ToM or whether they are a required 
precondition for a ToM development. Also, further research should include 
temperament that was only recently considered as influencing factor on social 
cognition. 
In conclusion, longitudinal research per se involves an enormous effort 
that cannot be undertaken by a single person. Not only does it consume a lot of 
time and money but also does it demand a huge amount of personal resources. 
Despite our collective effort in keeping in touch with the parents of our sample, 
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e.g. by sending birthday cards to the participating children, we were not able to 
prevent dropout from our project due to moving, parents’ time pressure or 
simple disinterest to take part in further assessments over the course of the 
studies. As the studies cannot be conducted alone, research assistants have to 
be employed for different tasks. Due to the duration of a longitudinal project, 
many different research assistants have to be trained as they probably finish 
their degrees before the end of the assessments as we have experienced plenty 
of times. Also, it has to be emphasized that the single assessments have to be 
planned and sophisticated more thoughtfully and carefully than in cross-
sectional research. Once decided on a certain method, the course has to be 
maintained until data collection is finished. You cannot change your study 
design without risking losing a part of your sample or the possibility to 
compare data between the tested children. However, to answer how children’s 
social-cognitive abilities develop it is necessary to ensure that further 
longitudinal studies were conducted as only this kind of study fulfills the 
conditions to answer many research questions thoroughly. 
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